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NOTES AND COMMENTS
LANDRUM-GRIFFIN AND THE TRUSTEESHIP IMBROGLIO*
"All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered
as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications. .... When the Almighty himself condescends to ad-
dress mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it
must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through
which it is communicated."
The Federalist, No. XXVI, p. 244 (Dawson ed. 1864).
INTRODUCTION
AGAINST an historic tradition of nonintervention, Congress, three years ago,
passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-
Griffin),' regulating the internal affairs of labor unions. As with any initial
venture into a new area of legislation, much of the act had to be experimental,
and much of the benefit to be gained informational. This is especially true of
Title III (Trusteeships).2 So little was known about trusteeships-the method
by which an international union supervises the activities of a subordinate body
when self-administration is thought unsatisfactory-that a section was in-
cluded providing for a report from the Secretary of Labor after three years on
the operation of the title.3 With the three year period nearly elapsed, and with
the Secretary's report due in the near future, an external view of the title's
operation is appropriate.
The Trend to Centralization
A few American trade unionists belong only to a local union,4 or only to an
international trade federation, 5 but the vast majority of members enlist in a
Yale Law Journal thanks Professors Summers and Wellington of the Labor Law
Division for bringing this paper to the attention of the Editors.
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin), 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186, 401-531 (Supp. II, 1961).
2. Title III, 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 461 (Supp. II, 1961) reprinted herein in
Appendix at 1527.
3. Section 305, 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 465 (Supp. II, 1961).
4. Most locals are subordinate units of internationals, but a few remain entirely in-
dependent, e.g., the Iowa City Brushmaking Employees Association, Bureau of Labor-
Management Reports, U.S. Department of Labor [hereinafter cited as BLMR], File No.
028134; or the Sun, Oil Office Employees Association of Bridgeport, Conn., BLMR File
No. 020775. Some of these independent locals are loosely affiliated with the Confederate
Unions of America. Address by Elmo Rogers, President, CUA., in International Mailer,
No. 10, Oct. 1961, pp. 34-40.
5. The Seamen have no locals and operate out of centralized hiring halls. See Wol-
lett & Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalisin--The Case of the Sailors, 4 STAx. L.
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host of related trade union entities when they pay their dues: a local union,
an international union, a city and a state federation, and probably the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations." In addition,
the structure of the American labor movement includes an interlocking pat-
tern of regions, districts, and trade councils.
7
The locus of trade union power has shifted during the growth of the labor
movement. For most of the nineteenth century, the local trade union jealously
guarded its autonomy against encroachment by either the international union 8
or national federations like the Knights of Labor.9 Locals joined city federa-
tions, but without relinquishing independence. 10 The concept of a labor move-
ment based primarily upon city federations of all trades reached its peak in
1887 with the unsuccessful strikes for the eight-hour day led by the Knights
of Labor." Thereafter the organizing principle of the American Federation
of Labor-a federation of international trade unions-gained precedence.'
2
By the first decade of this century the growth of international control at the
expense of local union independence was a marked trend.' 3 The path to con-
centration has not been smooth, nor uniform. Nevertheless, the translocation
of power continues.' 4
REv. 177 (1952). The Marine Engineers are trying to adopt a similar form of organization,
although not without opposition from some locals. See Calagaz v. Kellogg, 48 L.R.R.M.
2450 (S.D. Ala. 1961), appeal docketed, No. 19,332, 5th Cir.; Union Democracy in Action,
No. 4, Jan. 1962, pp. 13-14; SLAUGHTER, HOW THE MARINE ENGINEERS' BENEFICIAL Asso-
cIATION HAS BEEN CAPruRED By PRESSMAN, McKAY AND CALHOON AND WHY MEBA
No. 14 RESORTED TO FEDERAL COURT ACTION RATHER THAN YIELD TO MEBA DISTICT
No. 1 (1961) (a better-than-average pamphlet by an internal union dissenter).
6. Variations are numerous. Some large internationals remain outside the AFL-CIO,
e.g., the Teamsters, the United Mine Workers and some Railway Brotherhoods.
The term "international," as used herein, will refer not only to bodies formally labeled
"international unions," but also to similar organizations, called "nationals," "brotherhoods,"
"societies," etc.
7. BARASH, LABOR's GRASS ROOTS 134-36 (1961).
8. ULMAN, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION 3, 68-76 (1955).
9. See 2 COMMONS & ASSOCIATES, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 341-43,
380 (1926). The courts also protected locals against such encroachment. See Wicks v.
Monihan, 130 N.Y. 232, 29 N.E. 139 (1891) (expelled local not only allowed to take its
treasury with it, but also Knights of Labor ordered to pay money owed to local).
10. See 1 COMMONS & ASSOCIATES, op. cit. supra note 9, at 357-80; TAFT, ECONOMICS
AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR 428-29 (1942).
11. In 1886, the Knights had 700,000 members, almost ten per cent of the total indus-
trial wage earners; by 1900, the Knights had practically ceased to exist. PETERSON, A M-
CAN LABOR UNIONS 10 (rev. ed. 1952). For an extensive account of the struggle between
the Knights and the A.F. of L., see 2 COMMONS & ASSOCIATES, op. cit. supra note 9, at 395-
438, 482-95.
12. See TAFT, THE A.F. OF L. IN THE TIME OF GoMPERs 85-120 (1957). The A.F. of
L. was founded in 1881, but until 1886 it was called the Federation of Organized Trades
and Labor Unions. 2 COMM, ONS & ASSOCIATES, op. cit. supra note 9, at 309.
13. See Barnett, The Dominance of the National Union in American Labor Organi-
-ation, 27 Q.J. EcoN. 455, 466-74 (1913) ; ULMAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 379-87.
14. See generally ULMAN, op. cit. supra note 8; TAFT, ECONOMICS, op. cit. supra note
10, at 494-98; 3 MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR 257-59 (1945). For
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The great geographic mobility of labor in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, accompanied by the growth of national markets, made it difficult for
local unions or city federations individually to carry out the aims of trade
unionism. Uniform systems for apprenticeship, admission, and the administra-
tion of beneficiary activities were needed. Local trade unions initially at-
tempted to meet these problems through simple reciprocal arrangements; fore-
most among these was the "traveling card," designed to give a member of one
local privileges in others. Without central organization, however, the traveling
card and other reciprocal arrangements did not provide sufficient ties to
regulate the increasing national labor market.' 5 To meet these needs, local
unions turned to an already existing framework of central organization-the
international trade union, which previously had little authority, few functions,
and no staff' 6
The international began to grow in strength as local unions saw the ad-
vantages to be gained by partially surrendering their autonomy. Many im-
portant trade union functions, formerly the responsibility of local unions, such
as the initiation, financing and conduct of strikes, the negotiation of the basic
collective bargaining agreements, and the planning and administration of
fundamental trade union policies, are now generally under the direction of the
international union. Because local control of the strike weapon often led to
financial disaster and inhibited the strategic use of concerted efforts to attain
union demands, the internationals were called upon for centralized strike
funds, which in turn led to their control over strike activities. Such control,
moreover, enabled the international to determine the terms of the local col-
lective agreementY7 Economic reasons, such as the need to make wage levels
and welfare programs uniform among numerous localities, and the need gen-
erally to lessen internal frictions caused by inequalities in the international,
dictated this development. Centralization was also furthered by the strategic
necessity of deploying union resources at times and places best calculated to as-
sure victory.'
8
These objectives compelling international intervention persist whether
formal bargaining is done at the local or the international level. In practice,
the international may intervene in at least three ways. Where the union is
organized in a national product market, as the United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca, collective bargaining tends to be done by the international at the national
examples of this process in various unions, see LEITER, THE TEAMSTERS UNION 1-77
(1957); LiPsEr, TROW & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INSIDE PoLIIcs OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 19-21, 364-67 (1956) ; Karsh & London, The Coal
Miners: A Study of Union Control, 68 Q.J. EcoN. 415 (1954); cf. AuNsxy, JOHN L.
LEwis 36-60 (1949).
15. See ULMAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 76-108; TAir, ECONOMICS, op. Cit. supra note
10, at 495; 3 MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 257.
16. See TAFT, Go 'rERs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 95-100. See also individual examples
cited in note 14, supra.
17. SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRiAL RELATIONS 106 (1947).
18. UImAx, op. cit. supra note 8, at 155-200, 425-566.
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level. Where each local bargains separately, real authority is often vested in
representatives from the international who sit at the bargaining table. Even
in those unions where bargaining is still done by local officers, each contract
may be required to conform to international "master agreements" and to be
approved by the international president or executive board.19 International
dominance in the bargaining process may be expected to continue increasing,
for the complexity of modem day bargaining, involving intricate ques-
tions of productivity,20 elaborate financial statements,21 and highly complicatdd
welfare plans, 22 requires research and statistical work beyond the resources
of most local unions.
23
The growth of the international staff to handle these expanded activities
provided an additional impetus to centralization.2 4 Even a medium-sized
international may have hundreds of representatives, appointed by the inter-
national president or executive board,25 who constitute a bureaucracy which
identifies itself directly with the international leadership. 26 The staff quite
naturally develops a loyalty to the international officers and together with
them forms an administration party with a vested interest in maintaining the
political status quo.
Despite this continuing concentration of power, the local union remains a
basic structural unit of the labor movement, performing the day-to-day func-
19. Shister, The Locus of Union Control in Collective Bargaining, 60 Q.J. EcoN. 513
(1946). See also SLICHTER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 106; Pierson, The Government of
Trade Unions, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 593, 605-06 (1948).
The most notable exception, to the centralization of negotiations is found in the building
trades. SEIDMAN, LONDON, K.xsH & TAGLIACOZZO, THE WORxER VIEWs HIS UNION 46-
47 (1958) ; CHRIsTIE, EmPIRE IN WOOD 3-6, 318-23 (1956). The Typograhers also retain
decentralized negotiations which is apparently a factor aiding democratic operation. See
LiPsET, Tnow & COLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 20-21. SEIDMAN, LONDON, KARsH &
TAGLIACOZZo, supra at 216-17.
20. Productivity is an issue that promises to become more important at the bargaining
table. See EcoNomic REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 16-17 (1962); ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL
OF EcoNoMIc ADvisoRs 49-56 (1962).
21. An employer, pleading inability to meet a union wage demand, may be forced to
open his books. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
22. Until the Teamsters began centralizing the administration of their welfare plans
through regional conferences, the plans were so chaotic that neither employers nor the in-
ternational could supply the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare with full in-
formation as to the number of plans or the number of workers covered. See S. REP. No.
1734, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1955) (Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation) ; see
also LEITER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 214-20.
23. See HowE & WIDiCK, THE UAW AND WALTER REUTHER 252-53 (1949); Isaac-
son, The Local Union and the International, N.Y.U. 3RD ANN. CoNF. ON LABOR 493, 502
(1950).
24. See BARBASH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 157-58; TAFT, Gompzs, op. cit. mpra note
12, at 98-100.
25. See SLICHTER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 107-08.
26. See SEIDMAN, LONDON, KARSE & TAGLIACOZZO, op. cit. supra note 19, at 215. For
a brief description of one union, the Automobile Workers, see Howe & WIDICK, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 250-59.
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tions that most closely affect the individual workers.2 7 Even if wage issues
are settled at the national level, the issue of work rules remains for local
negotiation.28 Similarly, the grievance machinery necessarily remains in local
hands, primarily run by on-the-job stewards. As to strike action, it is the local
union, its leadership and its members, who must carry out the decisions. Thus,
the international cannot ignore the views of the local.29
The locals have traditionally been the stronghold of union democracy pri-
marily because of the close relationship between the members and the local
officers.30 In matters that concern the individual's job-working conditions
and grievances-the worker calls upon the local officers for solutions. The
worker's power to affect overall union policy necessarily starts in the local
union; it is at this level that the member actively participates in the life of the
union.3 1 The local officers acquire a political sensitivity to the members' needs,
heightened by their personal acquaintance with the members and generally
undiluted by distance or bureaucratic structure.3 2 Thus, the members feel a
loyalty to their local which affords the local leadership a solid political base
in its dealings with the international that is not solely dependent upon their
economic strength.3 3
27. Recent studies of the role of the local union abound. The best are: ROSE, UNION
SOLIDARITY: THE INTERNAL COHESION OF A LABOR UNION (1952) ; SAYLES & STRAUS,
THE LOCAL UNION (1953); TANNENBAUm & KAHN, PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL UNIONS
(1958); SEIDMAN, LONDON, KARSH & TAGLIACOZZO, THE WORKER VImws HIs UNION
(1958) ; and BARBASH, LABoR's GRASS ROOTS (1961).
28. With automation, local work rules may be crucial to the union member; work-
rules, not the economic package, caused the 1959 steel strike, Raskin, The Rout of Big
Steel, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1960, p. 43, col. 7; Editorial, Steel and "Work Rules," N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1960, p. 20, col. 1 ; and the 1961 auto strike, Widick, Rebellion in the Factory,
193 THE NATION 259 (1961); 6 News & Letters, No. 8, Oct. 1961, p. 1, col. 3.
29. E.g., When the UAW struck the United Aircraft system in 1960, their strike failed
at the key Sikorsky Aircraft plant (Bridgeport, Conn.). See N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1960,
p. 6, col. 5. Soon thereafter, on November 29, 1961, the UAW was decertified at Sikorsky.
New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 30, 1961, p. 1, col. 2. In the General Electric strike
of 1960, the Electrical Workers (IUE) learned too late that the huge Schenectady
local would not support the strike. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1960, § IV (News of the Week
in Review), p. 8, col. 1. The UAW, in the 1961 General Motors strike, could not get some
locals to return to work because of local issues. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 1;
id., Sept. 22, 1961, p. 24, col. 1; id., Sept. 24, 1961, § I, p. 50, col. 6; id., Sept. 25, p. 33, col.
1; id., Sept. 26, p. 20, col. 4.
30. BARBASH, Op. cit. mtpra note 7, at 228; LEISERSoN, AMERICAN TRADE UNION
DEMOCRACY 282-86 (1959); Cohn, The International and the Local Union, N.Y.U. 11TH
ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 7, 20 (1958); SEIDmAN, LONDON, KARsH & TAGLIACOZZO, Op. Cit.
supra note 19, at 5-8; Kovner & Lahne, Shop Society and the Union, 7 IND. & LAB. REL.
REv. 3, 4-5 (1958).
31. BARBASH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 54; SEIDmAN, LONDON, KAESH & TAGLIAcozzO,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 185-210.
32. See SEIDAIAN, LONDON, KARSH & TAGLACOZZO, op. cit. supra note 19, at 164-84.
33. It is true that local leaders are strongest with respect to the international when
they possess economic power measured in terms of functions and finances. SEIDMAN, LON-
DO-N, KAR sH & TAGLIACOzzo, op. cit. mipra note 19, at 216. But this does not mean that
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The local officers, close to the members and dependent upon their votes, are
likely to feel that they understand the local situation best and to resent interfer-
ence by the international. On the other hand, the international, especially the
staff, often feels that because it has expertise and a broader perspective, it can
make sounder decisions even on the local level. Conflict is inevitable.
International Discipline
Centralization has brought with it an array of disciplinary tools with which
the international may constrain a local in case of conflict.34 Some of these
powers are spelled out in the international constitution; others are vaguely
mentioned in the general powers of the international president or executive
board; still others are those which are inherent in any large bureaucracy. 35
Discipline may be applied in varying degrees. The international newspaper
may attack the local, or the international executive board may suddenly de-
mand strict compliance in matters previously ignored. International repre-
sentatives may attend membership meetings, argue publicly with the local
leadership, and encourage a revolt against them. On the other hand, the in-
ternational may ignore the local, refusing to help at negotiations or finding
"administrative difficulties" in financing a strike.
Such matters may be serious to a small local, but present no real threat to
a large local or coalition of locals resisting the demands of the international
leadership.30 To discipline a large intractable local, more drastic action is re-
quired. Expulsion is always a possibility, but this is an extreme answer which
depletes membership. A more effective method is to merge the refractory local
with a larger, loyal one 3 7 or to transfer a part of a local's jurisdiction to another
shifting functions and finances to the international necessarily renders locals politically
dormant. A group of locals can still, particularly if unhampered by international disciplinary
measures, exert much influence. See HOWE & Wlmicx, op. cit. mpra note 23, at 121-25
(Automobile Workers, 1944) ; Widick, supra note 28 (Automobile Workers, 1961) ; Union
Democracy in Action, No. 4, Jan. 1962, pp. 7-8 (Papermakers & Paperworkers, 1961-62) ;
id. pp. 9-10 (Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 1961-62). See also the series of cases
involving the Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 1959-62: Moschetta v. Cross, 46 L.R.R.M.
2810 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1960); id., 47 L.R.R.M. 2592 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1961); id., 48
L.R.R.M. 2607 (D.D.C. July 5, 1961) ; id., 48 L.R.R.M. 2608 (D.D.C. July 6, 1961) ; id.,
49 L.R.R.M. 2428 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 1962).
34. The following sources set forth and discuss a number of actual provisions: BUREAU
OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1263, UNION CONSTITUTION PRO-
vIsIoNs: TRUSTEESHIP (1959) [hereinafter cited as BLS No. 1263] ; Taft, The Constitutional
Power of the Chief Officer in American Labor Unions, 62 Q.J. EcoN. 459 (1948) ; Cohn,
The International and the Local Union, N.Y.U. 11TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 7 (1958).
35. See HowE & WDICK, op. cit. supra note 23, at 247-51. See generally BERLE &
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1-287 (1940).
36. LIPsET, Taow & COLEMAN, op. c:t. supra note 14, at 372-74.
37. See Massey v. Curry, 216 Ga. 22, 114 S.E.2d 416 (1960) (consolidation of Boiler-
makers, Local 554, Brunswick, Ga. with Boilermakers, Local 26, Savannah, Ga.-thereafter
Local 26 was placed in trusteeship). See Bureau of Labor-Management Reports, U.S.
Department of Labor, File No. 0740 [These files are hereinafter cited according to the form
BLMR, T-0000]. See also note 150 infra.
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local. In either case, the supporters of the local officers may find themselves a
minority.38 Alternatively, the international can revoke the charter of the
local and reissue a new charter eliminating the old leadership or giving the
"cnew" local less autonomy.39 But the most obvious solution is simply to install
an international administrator to ran the affairs of the local until it can be
placed on the "right road." The generic term for this species of union martial
law is the trusteeship.
THE USE OF TRUSTEESHIPS BEFORE LMRDA
Prior to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
relatively little was known about union trusteeships. Horace B. Davis had
made a pilot study,40 Philip Taft had discussed the closely related area of the
power of the international presidents,41 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics
was collecting various trusteeship provisions from union constitutions;42
specific attention had been drawn to only a few of the more outrageous uses
of trusteeships.43 In fact, little need arose even to define what a trusteeship
might encompass. Courts dealing with cases involving trusteeships had no
need to define the category precisely, for each trusteeship was sui generis-de-
fined according to the particular international constitution. Similar practices
were variously labeled. What was revocation of charter to the Mine Workers
was very similar to a trusteeship in the Teamsters, an administratorship in
the Communications Workers, a receivership in the Bricklayers, a provisional
government in the Brick and Clay Workers, and a supervisorship in the
Operating Engineers."
Some unions have no formal provision for trusteeships in their constitu-
tions, 45 but the absence of such provisions has not always prevented the
38. See Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters, 143 Cal. App. 2d 474, 300 P.2d 159 (1956);
Nilan v. Colleran, 283 N.Y. 84, 27 N.E.2d 511 (1940) (Plasterers).
39. See Local 373 v. International Ass'n of Bridge Ironworkers, 120 N.J. Eq. 220, 233,
184 Atl. 531, 537 (Ct Err. & App. 1936). This tactic has been partially blocked by the
LMRDA of 1959. See Hughes v. Local 11, International Ass'n of Bridge Ironworkers, 287
F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1961).
40. Davis, Receivership in, American Unions, 67 Q.J. EcoN. 231 (1953).
41. Taft, The Constitutional Power of the Chief Officer in American Labor Unions,
62 Q.J. Ecox. 459 (1948).
42. BLS No: 1263 was published in November 1959, just after passage of the LMRDA.
43. See, e.g., Davis, Unionism in Receivership, 20 LABOR AGE 4 (1931) ; H. SEIDmAx,
LABoR CZARS 156-71 (1938) ; Note, 51 YAix L.J. 1372 (1942).
44. BLS No. 1263, at 8, 16,21,22, 27, 30.
45. Davis, Receivership in American Unions, 67 Q.J. EcoN. 231, 233 (1953), found
formal trusteeship provisions in only 48 of the 139 constitutions studied (39%) ; BLS No.
1263, at 2, found such formal provisions in 67 of the 114 constitutions (59%) they studied
in 1959. Although the surveys cannot be strictly compared, they support a conclusion that
even before the LMRDA more unions were formally placing trusteeship clauses in their
constitutions. Levitan, Union, Trusteeships: The Federal Law and an Inventory, 11 LAn.
L.J. 1067, 1068 (1960). Both studies can be taken as minimal estimates, see note 46 infra;
further, it can be expected that unions will clarify the trusteeship clauses in their constitu-
tions and perhaps place such clauses into their constitutions if none now exist. See Levitan,
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international from suspending the autonomy of locals.46 Other constitu-
tions dearly have trusteeship provisions, but they are rarely applied. 47 The
early union constitutions probably contained no trusteeship clauses.48 The
Teamsters, in 1908, apparently were the first to insert such provisions in their
constitution.49 Though the earliest use of a trusteeship was in 1911, by the
Bookbinders,5 0 the first "important" locals to be plunged into trusteeship
were the Cleveland Stationary Engineers and the New York City Musicians
shortly after World War I.rl During the 1920's, the Mine Workers made
extensive use of the trusteeship tool 52 and the practice seemed to be increasing
fairly rapidly at least until 1959.53 No one, however, could obtain accurate
figures on the number of trusteeships before the LMRDA ;54 at that time 492
The Federal Law of Union Trusteeship, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 443, 453 (Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as SYMPOSIUM ON LMRDA].
46. BLS No. 1263, at 3. Compare BLS No. 1263 (Steelworkers' constitution has no
formal trusteeship provision), with Bureau of Labor-Management Reports, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, "Trusteeships Over Subordinate Labor Organizations Reported to the Bureau of
Labor-Management Reports Through November 30, 1961," 20-21 (Steelworkers reported
21 trusteeships). This extensive study is unofficial and was prepared for the author by the
Office of Research and Statistics of the BLMR. It will hereinafter be cited as BLMR,
UNOFFICIAL FIGUESS, Nov. 30, 1961.
47. As of 1954, the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks had not used the
trusteeship power in 30 years. TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS
128-30 (1954). But they have since imposed at least one trusteeship. See Palisades Lodge
173 v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 47 L.R.R.M. 2605 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
48. Neither the monumental study of the early American labor movement by COMMONS
& ASSOCIATES, op. cit. upra note 9, nor the specific study of union centralization made in
1913 by Barnett, supra note 13, mentions trusteeships.
49. See LEITER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 73.
50. International Bhd. of Bookbinders, The International Bookbinder, Dec. 1911, pp.
429-31.
51. See Davis, Receivership it American Unions, 67 Q.J. EcoN. 231 (1953).
52. Karsh & London, supra note 14; ALINSxy, op. cit. supra note 14, at 51-57.
53. Compare Davis, Unions it Receivership, 20 LABOR AGE 4 (1931), with Davis,
Receivership if; American Unions, 67 Q.J. EcoN. 231 (1953). By late 1955, the Teamsters
had 105 of their 897 locals in trusteeship, Jacobs, The World of Jimmy Hoffa-I, The
Reporter, Jan. 24, 1957, p. 17; and 108 of 876 by early 1958, S. R P. No. 1417, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 443 (1958). J. Seidman, Problems of Democratic Procedures it Unions, 17 J. Mo.
BAR 73 (1961). In 1958, one-fifth of the membership of the International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers was in trusteeship. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1958). The
problem of determining whether the trusteeship is more frequently used during one period
rather than another is complicated by the lack of complete studies and by the fact that in
some unions a trusteeship once imposed may never be lifted. See, e.g., Karsh & London,
supra note 14 (the Mine Workers) ; S. RaP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 371-443 (1958)
(the Operating Engineers) ; see also notes 79-81 infra and accompanying text. But see
Mangum, One Union's Experience Under LMRDA Titles I-IV, in SYmposium ON
LMRDA 1165 (the Operating Engineers).
54. During the congressional debate in 1959 on labor legislation, the AFL-CIO at-
tempted to determine what use was made of trusteeships by affiliated internationals. The
AFL-CIO reported that 75 affiliated internationals made no current use of trusteeships and
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trusteeships were reported to the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports.",
It is clear that the purposes of trusteeships can not be easily categorized.
Certainly many trusteeships were properly imposed and administered; it was
equally certain that in many instances the power was grossly abused.
When a new local is organizing its jurisdiction,56 or when a local is being
liquidated because the employer is going out of business, 57 a trusteeship is
useful organizationally both for the members and the international. A trustee-
ship may also be imposed on the local union as a necessary method of union
discipline, as when local officers abuse their positions by stealing from the
treasury or by suppressing the democratic rights of the members. The Meat
Cutters quickly placed a New York local under trusteeship after a congres-
sional committee exposed financial malpractice ;r, the Steelworkers suspended
the autonomy of a Youngstown local when the Secretary of Labor found
probable cause to believe that the officers had stuffed the ballot box in a
the remaining 24 had only 97 trusteeships in effect. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86
(1959). These figures proved to be far lower than the facts revealed. See notes 152-56 infra
and accompanying text and chart entitled TRUSTEESHIPS REPORTED IN EFFECT AT PASSAGE
OF LMRDA, Appendix at 1522-23.
55. BLMR, UNOFFICIAL FIGuREs, Nov. 30, 1961.
However, even this figure is open to some question. Aside from the fact that definitional
problems abound in the area, see text infra at notes 115-50, there are signs of both inflation
and deflation in the number of trusteeships originally reported to the BLMR. There are
signs that some internationals terminated trusteeships shortly before being required to file
reports. The Teamsters, who had 108 locals in trusteeship in 1958, J. Seidman, Problems
of Democratic Procedures in Unions, 17 J. Mo. Bar. 73, 74 (1961) ; S. REP. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1958) (17 percent of all locals in trusteeship), reported only 55 local
trusteeships in effect in late 1959, BLMR, UNOFFICIAL FIGURES, Nov. 30, 1961, and the
fact that District 50 of the Mine Workers, while it reported 122 local trusteeships, man-
aged to terminate 114 within the first six months of the act's operation indicates that force
of habit was the reason for a good many trusteeships; such trusteeships might well be
terminated merely on the compulsion of having to report them to the public. Ibid. On the
other hand, some local situations may have been reported as trusteeships as a matter of
caution on the part of the international. The Carpenters reported a number of district or-
ganizations as being under trusteeship and, in addition, every local union affiliated with
those districts, whether or not the local's autonomy was otherwise affected. Horowitz,
Possible Effects of LMRDA's Trusteeship Provisions, in Symposiu oN LMRDA 458,
464 (1961) ; Levitan, Union Trusteeships: The Federal Law and au, Inventory, 11 LAE.
L.J. 1067, 1077 (1960). The Railway Supervisors have a number of locals in the Chicago
area, whose administration is handled by international officers, with only one or two mem-
bers. Ibid. At the time the act went into effect, certain Teamster locals were under trustee-
ship. Such trusteeships might have been lifted except that court injunctions prevented the
international officers from so acting. E.g., BLMR, T-0364 (Teamsters, Local 447, St.
Louis, Mo.), BLMR, T-0349 (Teamsters, Local 245, Springfield, Mo.).
56. Once the jurisdiction is organized the legitimate need ends, but not always the
trusteeship. See, e.g., the thirty-year vassalage of Local 150 of the Operating Engineers.
S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 371-73 (1958).
57. See, e.g., BLMR, T-0534 (Upholsterers, Local 69, Rochester, N.Y.).
58. BLMR, T-0055 (Meat Cutters, Local 342, Jamaica, N.Y.); see also S. REP. No.
621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 309-74 (1959).
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local election.5 9 In other cases the trusteeship has been prompted by locals
persisting in actions that violate the international constitution or the principles
of responsible trade unionism. Thus, in the Auto Workers, when a Memphis
local repeatedly refused to desegregate local facilities despite the international
constitution,60 and when an Ohio local could not prevent a series of wild-cat
strikes notwithstanding stern warnings from the international,6 1 the UAW
installed international administratorships. Finally, other conduct by locals, dif-
ficult to classify, may also justify immediate action. Perhaps the best example
is provided by the Texas Operating Engineers' local run by Homer Pierce:
When the international sent a committee to investigate the affairs of the local,
Business Agent Pierce simply responded by shutting down a large part of the
Texas construction industry in observance of a "Homer Pierce Holiday.
6 2
In many cases, however, trusteeships cannot be justified on the basis of
misbehavior in the local. Rather the explanation must generally be sought in
the political relations between the local and the international. For trustee-
ships have long been employed to end or prevent opposition to the policies and
directions of the international leadership.63 The special needs of the labor
movement, as perceived by the international officers and staff, accentuate the
conflict. The international, analogizing the union to an army,6 believes that
discipline and internal unity are essential if the union is to bargain and strike
successfully. Further, there is a pervasive sense of fear that surrounds the
labor movement-the union's existence appears constantly threatened by the
employers or the government, the Communists or other unions-and these
persistent threats seem to necessitate solidarity and unanimity within the
union. Whatever the validity of these fears, they are real.6
5
59. BLMR, T-0660 (Steelworkers, Local 1617, Youngstown, Ohio); see also [Fiscal
Year 1960-61] BLMR ANN. REP. 4-5; Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1961, p. 1, col. 1;
Riesel, "Commandos" Probe Locals, New York Mirror, April 10, 1961, p. 8, col. 1.
60. BLMR, T-0572 (Auto Workers, Local 988, Memphis, Tenn.); Sims v. Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile Workers, Public Review Board Case No. 52 (1961);
see also [Fiscal Year 1960-61] BLMR ANN. REP. 7-8; New America, March 24, 1961,
p. 7, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1961, p. 1, col. 1; Weisz, The United States
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 84 INT'L LAB. Rxv. 75, 96
(1961).
61. BLMR, T-0519 (Auto Workers, Local 122, Twinsburg, Ohio); Weissman v. In-
ternational Union, United Automobile Workers, Public Review Board Case No. 38 (1960).
62. Mangum, supra note 53, at 1176; BLMR, T-0540 (Operating Engineers, Local
450, Houston, Texas).
63. See Davis, Unionism in Receiverslip, 20 LABOR AGE 4 (1931) ; see also notes 68-81
in!ra and accompanying text.
64. See Muste, Factional Fights in Trade Unions, in AERiCAN LABOR DYNAmcS
332 (Hardman ed. 1928) ; LEisERsoN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 68-69.
65. The pervasive sense of fear that surrounds the labor movement continues despite
union security clauses. Notwithstanding the legal protections which federal legislation has
established, such fear has led to a deeply rooted belief that the union must maintain a united
front against all foes. This atmosphere is not conducive to the democratic aspirations and
goals which the labor movement sets for itself. Thus, organized opposition in control of a
local union is too often engulfed in- vindictive charges of disruption, dual unionism, fac-
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But stripping locals of their autonomy, even to further the legitimate objec-
tives of unionism, has serious effects on the operation of the democratic struc-
ture of labor unions. For democracy in the international, in the sense of active
dissent and challenge to the international administration, is only possible if the
members are able to utilize without reprisal the political machinery of their local
unions, such as the local newspaper, the stature of local office, the delegates
to international conventions, and the local staff, patronage, and funds. With-
out control of such machinery, the members can hardly influence the policies
of the international or displace the incumbent leadership.6 6 If the local or-
ganization can be rendered impotent through the imposition of trusteeships,
such trusteeships being in fact established to combat opposition and dis-
sent,67 leadership support and power on the local level is effectively nullified.
tionalism, and "communism." LEIsEasoN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 68-77, contains an ex-
cellent discussion of this schizoid philosophy in the labor movement. What often results in
the area of trusteeships is a type of "guided democracy" or paternalism whereby the in-
ternational administration steps into the local situation merely because of political differ-
ences between the international and the local, with the real goal of placing the local on
the "right road" and under "safe" leadership. In other words, union democracy is permis-
sible as long as the "democratic rights" are exercised in support of the international lead-
ership.
66. There is one decisive proof of democracy in a union... : Oppositionists have the
right to organize freely into "parties," to set up factional machines, to circulate pub-
licity and to propagandize among the members.
HOwE & WIDICK, op. cit. supra note 23, at 262; see also LiPsEr, TRoW & COLEMAN, op.
cit. supra note 14, at 398-403.
67. A distinction should be drawn between an opposition which is loyal to its inter-
national union While opposing the international's current leadership and one which is a
"dual union" either attempting to form a new international union or to carry some locals
over to another international union. Even aside from the merits of true dual unionism-
and perhaps union democracy requires some protection even for those who desire to change
international affiliation (particularly in view of labor legislation that makes the majority
union the exclusive bargaining agent for all workers in the bargaining unit)-the problem
is magnified by international officers who are quick to see dual unionism in any movement
which disagrees with their policies or threatens to replace them in the next election. See,
e.g., the charges against the Dues Protest Committee of the Steelworkers, contained in
STEELWORKERS COMMITTEE TO SPONSOR TRUTH, THE MASK OF DECEIT: Expost OF THE
GOALS & TECHNIQUES OF THE DUES PROTEST COMMITTEE (DPC) LEADERS (undated).
The nature of a dual union movement, such as that involved in the formation of the C.I.O.,
GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT, 1935-1941 (1960), or which currently racks the Bakery Workers [Bakery &
Confectionary Workers (Ind.) versus American Bakery & Confectionary Workers (AFL-
CIO) ] and the Laundry Workers [Laundry, Cleaning & Dye House Workers (Ind.)
versus Laundry, Dry Cleaning Int'l Union (AFL-CIO)], is radically different from an
opposition political party as it exists in the Typographical Union, LIpsEr, TROW & COLE-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 398-403, or a political caucus or faction. HowE & Wxnicx,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 262 (Auto Workers) ; Union Democracy In Action, No. 4, Jan.
1962 [Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers] and the [United Papermakers & Paper-
workers]. For an excellent discussion of how the courts sometimes distinguish dual union-
ism from other matters of union discipline, see Summers, Union Schism it Perspective:
Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards, and Projected Answers, 45 VA. L. REv. 261 (1959) ;
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALEn L.J. 175
(1960).
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And without the possibility of opposition, the international leadership may
remain in office perpetually. Such leadership, removed as it is from the mem-
bers, may lose contact with, and perhaps regard for, the desires of the workers.
The political trusteeship came into major prominance during the nineteen-
twenties when John L. Lewis consolidated the autocratic rule thought necessary
for the survival of the United Mine Workers.68 The Mine Workers' constitution
allowed the international president to revoke charters and establish provisional
governments at will,69 subject only to appeal to the executive board and the
international convention where, despite dogged battles, opposition to Lewis
was hopeless. Initially local autonomy was suspended in Nova Scotia, Kansas,
and Illinois; when other districts showed signs of revolt they were similarly
treated.70 Government by trusteeship became a way of life in the Mine Work-
ers; the philosophy of this government was well expressed by Mr. Lewis:
I trust that the C6nvention, in considering this matter [autonomy] will
consider it for what it is really worth and what it means to the Organiza-
tion. It is not a fundamental principle that the Convention is discussing.
It is a question of business expediency and administration policy as affect-
ing certain geographical areas of the Organization. It is a question of
whether you desire your Organization to be the most effective instru-
mentality within the realm of possibility for a labor organization or
whether you prefer to sacrifice the efficiency of your organization in some
respects for a little more academic freedom in the selection of some local
representatives in a number of districts.
71
During the wild melee that existed in the Operating Engineers Union in
the late nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties, trusteeships were also
imposed with abandon; by 1931 one hundred four locals, including all the
locals in Ohio and Texas and most of the important ones elsewhere, were in
trusteeship. 72 The IUOE constitution gave the president power to impose
trusteeships or revoke charters for "incompetency, negligence, or failure in
68. The twelve year period from 1921 to 1933 was one of increasing difficulty for the
United Mine Workers of America: not only did the membership steadily decline, but in
the coal regions bloody civil war repeatedly broken out between miners and employers and
between the miners themselves. The best accounts of this chaos are to be found in ALiNsyY,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 36-66, and COLEMAN, MEN AND CoAL 105-46 (1943).
69. Karsh & London, supra note 14, at 416-19. ALINSKY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 136-
46. Further, once a charter is "revoked" in the Mine Workers, it is seldom restored to its
former autonomy. Karsh & London, supra at 417. Seventeen UMWA Districts have been
in trusteeship since 1933 and four others since 1947. BLMR, UNOFFICIAL FIGURES, Nov.
30, 1961, T-0014 through T-0034.
70. See ROE, JUGGERNAUT 94-99 (1949); AUiNsxY, JOrN L. LEWIS 51-61 (1949).
71. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE UNITED MINE
WORKERS OF A mFuCA 122 (1936). Actually passing a resolution on autonomy probably
would not have resulted in a restoration of local control, for if a resolution did go against
President Lewis, he might well announce to the delegates, as he did on another occasion:
"All of your energies and all of your passions have been a tragic waste, for I tell you that
this resolution is going where all resolutions go I" ALINSrKY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 57.
72. Davis, Unionism in Receivership, 20 LABOR AGE 4 (1931).
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successfully carrying out their duties. '73 Revocation and reissuance of charters
was skillfully used to keep the trusteeships beyond the reach of the opposi-
tion and the courts. 74 The international president would revoke the charters
of locals under insurgent control, form a new local covering the same juris-
diction, and then place the new local under trusteeship because it was "newly
organized. '75 Opposition to the international leadership was stubborn and
litigious, but the international prevailed. In one instance, the rebels in Local
125 obtained an injunction lifting the trusteeship, because the trustee's) actions
had exceeded any possible interpretation of even the IUOE constitution. The
next day, the international president responded to the injunction by revoking
Local 125's charter and issuing a new one to trusteed-Local 130.76
Nor were such infringements upon local autonomy limited to the act of im-
posing the trusteeship. Trusteeships could also be used as a cover for abuses
like looting the local treasury 77 or manipulating votes at conventions. 78 And
73. Operating Engineers, CONSTrruTIoN art. IV, § 2, quoted in Irwin v. Possehl, 143
Misc. 855, 859, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597, 601-02 (Sup. Ct. 1932). But even these broad powers
were not deemed sufficient by the international officers for the job they wanted to do and,
by 1944, the powers of the International President, granted in the IUOE Constitution,
provided that "Whenever in his opinion the best interests of the organization require it
... he shall have the power to suspend or remove such individual members, suspend or
remove such local officers, suspend or remove charters of such Local Unions or place such
Local Unions and their officers and members under International supervision." See Operat-
ing Engineers, CONSTITUTION art. VI, § 1 (1944), quoted in Taft, The Constitutional
Power of the Chief Officer in American Labor Unions, 62 Q.J. EcoN. 459, 469 (1948). In
actual practice, International President Huddell remarked that "where it is found that a
local's progress is hampered by an inferior leader, and that the local has amongst its
membership one better qualified to successfully transact the affairs of the local, and that
he would do so, that man should be recognized by our General President and placed in
charge, and kept there while satisfactory." Quoted in Irwin v. Possehl, supra at 861-62,
257 N.Y. Supp. at 604.
74. This ten-year battle that begins with hope but ends in futility is reported generally
in H. SEIDMAN, LABOR CzA~s 156-65 (1938) ; and Note, 51 YALE L.J. 1372, 1375-77 (1942).
For the court history, see Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336
(1931) ; McGhee v. Possehl, 141 Misc. 296, 252 N.Y. Supp. 536 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Irwin v.
Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Irwin v. Possehl, 145 Misc.
907, 261 N.Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; McGrath v. Dillon, 145 Misc. 912, 262 N.Y.
Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Fay v. Robinson, 251 App. Div. 803, 287 N.Y. Supp. 326 (1936),
nodified inem., 277 N.Y. 610, 14 N.E.2d 187 (1938) ; Rodier v. Fay, 7 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup.
Ct. 1938) ; Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
75. The process was further rationalized by using the same trustee for a number of
locals, at least until Trustee Patrick Commerford was sent to the Atlanta Penitentiary for
income tax evasion. United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
289 U.S. 759 (1933) ; see also People v. Commerford, 233 App. Div. 2, 251 N.Y. Supp. 132
(1931).
76. Irwin v. Possehl, 145 Misc. 907, 908-09, 261 N.Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1932);
McGrath v. Dillon, 145 Misc. 912, 262 N.Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
77. See, e.g., Locals 100 and 300 of the Bakery & Confectionery Workers where some
$40,000 was apparently misused by the trustee, and Local 150 of the Operating Engineers
where gifts such as Cadillacs came regularly. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-
16, 381-84 (1958).
78. See, e.g., the attempt to control Teamster Joint Council No. 16 in New York
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once imposed, trusteeships lingered on. For instance, the Mine Workers
presently have seventeen districts which have been i' trusteeship since 1933
or earlier ;0 the Operating Engineers in 1958 had two locals which had been in
trusteeships for over thirty years and several others for more than ten years ;80
other unions also had long-standing trusteeships.81
CONGRESs Acts
Beginning in 1957, the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field of the United States Senate, popularly known as
the McClellan Committee, exposed the details of the sad state of democracy
in large sections of the labor movement and provided numerous examples of
abuses of the trusteeship power.8 2 The McClellan Committee concentrated
much of its fire on the misuse of trusteeships in three internationals: the
Bakery and Confectionary Workers,8 3 the Teamsters, 84 and the Operating
Engineers.s5 The Committee also commented on trusteeships in the Jewelry
Workers," the Allied Industrial Workers,8 7 and the Meat Cutters.8 8 The
Committee examined a total of twenty trusteeships, enough to discover some
flagrant abuses, although hardly sufficient for a balanced view.89 From these
cases-all of them involving trusteeship abuses-the Committee drew its con-
clusions. 0o
In the Bakery and Confectionary Workers, one trusteeship began when the
local president walked into his office one morning to find himself facing a gun
City, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 198-211 (1958), and the election in Teamster
Joint Council No. 13 in St. Louis, S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-49 (1959).
79. BLMR, UNOFFICIAL FIGUREs, Nov. 30, 1961.
80. See S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1958).
81. See note 53 mipra.
82. The McClellan Committee began its Investigation of Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field on February 26, 1957, pursuant to S.J. Res. No. 74, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957), continued in 1958 pursuant to S.f. Res. No. 221, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), and S.J. Res. No. 44, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), concluding on September 9,
1959. During that time, the Committee heard testimony which was eventually printed in 58
parts covering 20,432 pages, and issued an interim report S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958), and a final report, S. RF,. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
83. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-16 (1958).
84. Id. at 237-43; S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-63 (1959); S. REP. No.
1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 672-77, 704-05 (1960).
85. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 373-85, 417-37 (1958).
86. S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-41 (1959).
87. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-204 (1958).
88. See S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 270-75 (1959).
89. The extent of the corruption surprised prominent labor leaders. See, e.g., the testi-
mony of AFL-CIO President George Meany. 105 CONG. REc. 14644-45 (1959).
90. In not examining instances of proper use of the trusteeship power, and considering
the limited number of trusteeship abuses investigated, the Committee's conclusions are
open to some question. Senator McNamara complained that the Committee's conclusions
were too broad for such a limited survey. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 454, 459
(1958) (individual views of Sen. McNamara).
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in the hands of the international's new trustee.9 1 The trustee, after looting the
local treasury, was rewarded with a new Cadillac for his "great many sacri-
fices." 92 Even after the local's autonomy was restored the restraint remained,
for in the BCW the imposition of a trusteeship was "the easiest thing in the
world to do."
9 3
In the Teamsters, paper locals were created for the purpose of controlling
the New York joint Council. 94 Four officials of the Pontiac, Michigan local
were indicted on extortion charges. To the members' relief, a trusteeship was
placed over the local with then-International Vice-President Hoffa as trustee.
To their anguish, the trustee quickly appointed two of the indicted officials to
administer the affairs of the local and directed that $30,000 of local funds be
spent for their defense. When the officials were convicted, the trustee continued
their salaries as Business Agents during their prison terms as a matter of
"good and welfare."95 As to the Operating Engineers, the Committee con-
cluded:
Of all the unions subject to committee inquiry over the past year, none
has proven more backward, more indifferent to the changing times, more
incredibly feudal, than the International Union of Operating Engineers.
Under a constitution unworthy of the name and, even so, seldom
observed except in the breach, IUOE members have dwelt in a state of
servitude scarcely imaginable in the midst of a democratic society.96
The investigations of the McClellan Committee bolstered reform elements in
some unions, 97 led to long overdue termination of a number of trusteeships,08
and resulted in the imposition of at least one trusteeship over a corrupt local.09
91. Local 100, Bakery Workers. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1958).
Imposition of trusteeships by gun-point was not unknown in other internationals. Roy
Underwood was so displaced by Joey Fay in Local 542, Operating Engineers. Id. at 425.
92. Id. at 115. Local 100 probably saved itself money with this "gift"; certainly it rid
the local of a real drain on its treasury.
93. Id. at 114.
94. This was graphically illustrated by a large chart in S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. opp. 202 (1958). See also Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
95. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 237, 252 (1958).
96. Id. at 371.
97. The charges of corruption, forced the resignation of the International President of
the Operating Engineers, William E. Maloney. J. Seidman, Problems of Democratic Pro-
cedures in Unions, 17 J. Mo. BAP 73, 74 (1961). They were a contributing factor in the
eventual resignation of James G. Cross, International President of the Bakery & Confec-
tionery Workers. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
98. The Operating Engineers terminated their thirty-year trusteeships before the
LMRDA became law. BLMR, UNOFFICIAL FIGURds, Nov. 30, 1961; Mangum, supra note
53, at 1176. The Teamsters, with trusteeships over 108 of their 876 locals in 1957, J. Seid-
man, supra note 97, at 74, cut that number to 55 by September 1959. BLMR, UNOFFICIL.
FIGURES, Nov. 30, 1961.
99. After the McClellan Committee had turned up corruption in Local 342 of the Meat
Cutters, S. Rim. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1959), the international placed a trus-
teeship over the local on June 6, 1958, which was terminated on Sept. 15, 1960. BLMR,
T-0055 (Meat Cutters, Local 342, Jamaica, N.Y.).
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More important than these scattered reforms, Congress was spurred to ac-
tion :100 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was
enacted.10 '
The Kennedy-Ervin Bill,10 2 presented to Congress on January 28, 1959,
included a title on trusteeships. 10 3 On September 4, 1959, after seven months
of extensive rewriting, amendment, and debate on a number of different bills,
the LMRDA emerged substantially altered by the addition of a "Bill of
Rights," protecting the individual rights of workers, and amendments to the
Taft-Hartley Act.'0 4 During this extended period most of the controversy
concerned these new titles, while the trusteeship title glided quietly through
the labyrinthine process from bill to bill with little change and less discussion.
Some union spokesmen complained that Title III was going too far, but
pressed no changes on Congress. 10 5 Some Congressmen thought the trustee-
ship provisions were not strict enough to prevent the abuses brought to light
by the McClellan Committee, but they also remained largely inactive,10 6 with
100. Congress has not been prone to enacting major labor legislation; once every
twelve years has been the pattern. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat.
449 (1935), as amended by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1958); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (Landrum-Griffin), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186, 401-531 (Supp.
II, 1961).
101. The Senate had passed S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The House, rather
than amend S. 1555, started over, rejecting the Elliott Bill (H.R. 8342) and the Shelley
Bill (H.R. 8490), and finally passing the substance of the Landrum-Griffin Bill (H.R.
8400). The bill that came from the Joint Conference more closely resembled the House
version. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), on S. 1555; see also the
Senate conferees' Section-by-Section Analysis of the Joint Conference Bill, reprinted in
1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE LMRDA OF 1959, at 947 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as LEG. HIST. LMRDA]. It was presented to and passed by the House on September 3,
1959, and by the Senate on September 4, 1959.
102. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
103. Id., Title II. Title I (Bill of Rights) was originally proposed by Sen. McClellan
as part of S. 1137, a substitute for the Committee Bill. Although S. 1137 was rejected by
the Committee, the Bill of Rights was subsequently accepted by the Senate as an amend-
ment to S. 1555 (The Kennedy-Ervin Bill). 105 CONG. REc. 6492-93 (1959) ; LEG. HIsT.
LMRDA 1119. It was eventually passed after substantial alteration by the Kuchel amend-
ment. 105 CONG. REc. 6727 (1959) ; LEG. HIsT. LMRDA 1239. Thereafter the trusteeship
title became Title III.
104. Title VII, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186 (Supp. II, 1961).
105. Some union spokesmen suggested there was not sufficient information about trus-
teeships upon which to base any legislation other than the reporting section and the sub-
sequent report to Congress in three years. 105 CONG. REc. A 6657, 6659 (Daily ed. August
3, 1959) (paper by Sar A. Levitan) [A indicates material absent from permanent edition
of CONGREssIONAL REcoRD]. The AFL-CIO seemed particularly disturbed by the dual
jurisdiction of state and federal courts over trusteeships. Ibid.; see also id. at A 6401, A 6402
(Daily ed. July 15, 1959) (Rep. Dent).
106. E.g., Senator Goldwater complained that § 302 "imposes virtually no limitations."
105 CONG. REc. 14273 (1959) ; LEG. HIsT. LMRDA 1323. He did not incorporate this idea
into a proposal, although he did back the Dodd Amendment, 105 CONG. REc. 6680-81
(1959) ; LEG. HIsT. LMRDA 1207. See note 228 infra.
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one exception. Senator Dodd challenged the basic scheme of the title by an
amendment which would have made all trusteeships presumptively invalid
after thirty days by requiring the international to justify the original imposi-
tion in a hearing before the Secretary of Labor. This amendment-the only
subject of debate over the trusteeship title on the floor of either house-was
finally defeated. 107 Although there were numerous minor alterations in the
title, the only one that deserves mention grants individual union members
standing to enforce the title in federal courts.108 The legislative history of Title
III in general indicates that no one in Congress gave much thought to how
the trusteeship provisions would operate in practice.
The disclosures of the McClellan Committee convinced Congress that
federal law should intervene to curb the misuse of trusteeships, but the solution
was complicated by the realization that the trusteeship is also a necessary
tool of proper union disicipline. 1 9 No investigation or study provided any
help in drawing the line between the use of a trusteeship to discipline a
corrupt or irresponsible local and its use to terminate disagreement between
the local and the international over policy, strategy, or personalities. The
statute indicates that Congress accepted as a practical impossibility the formula-
tion of a definition of proper purpose, and therefore left it in large part to the
courts to determine the legality of trusteeships.
Title III
The final version of Title III110 contains three functions: reporting and dis-
closure, regulation of trusteeships, and enforcement.
Section 301 requires an initial report from every union imposing a trustee-
ship, semi-annual reports during the life of the trusteeship, and a termination
report. These reports must contain the reasons for establishing or continuing
the trusteeship, the nature and extent of membership participation in the
selection of delegates to policy-determining conventions, and a complete
financial report of the local. The Secretary of Labor may enforce section 301
on his own initiative. Section 305, which is unique in the LMRDA, and which
is a recognition by Congress that additional information on trusteeships was
essential, requires the Secretary to report to Congress on the operation of the
Trusteeship title at the expiration of three years. This report, due shortly, may
form the basis for further trusteeship legislation.1
Section 302, after listing some specific purposes for which a trusteeship may
be established, provides a catchall clause authorizing all trusteeships "carrying
107. See note 228 infra.
108. Sections 304(a) and 306 were changed to open the federal courts to suits under
Title III by individuals as well as by the Secretary of Labor. See discussion at notes 217-23
infra.
109. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1959) ; 105 CONG. REc. 14989-90
(1959) (Sen. Morse); LEG. HIST. LMRDA 1327 (1959).
110. 73 Stat. 530 (1959) ; 29 U.S.C. § 461 (1959). The full text of Title III is repro-
duced in Appendix at 1527.
111. The Secretary's report is due in September 1962.
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out the legitimate objects of [the international]." In addition to the showing
of proper purpose, the section requires that all trusteeships be established in
accordance with the union's constitution and bylaws. Section 303 (a) prohibits
the use of trusteeships to milk the local treasury or to pack a convention by
counting the votes of delegates of trusteed locals unless such delegates have
been elected by a secret vote of the membership. Section 303(b) penalizes
willful violations of section 303 (a) by imprisonment or fine. Civil enforcement
of section 303 by the Secretary is apparently possible only if he receives a com-
plaint from a member or subordinate body of the union.1 12
Section 304 is the basic enforcement section of the title. Section 304(a)
directs the Secretary to investigate the complaint of a union member or sub-
ordinate body concerning a violation of any part of Title III except section
301 and further provides that:
[I] f the Secretary finds probable cause to believe that such violations has
occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, without disclosing the
identity of the complainant, bring a civil action in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such
relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
Section 304(b) removes a perennial barrier to suits against international
unions by granting federal jurisdiction over the international in the district
where the trusteed local is situated.113 Section 304(c) sets up a shifting pre-
sumption to judge trusteeships properly established under both requirements
of section 302: If a trusteeship meets the tests of section 302, and if it was
authorized or ratified after a fair hearing by the international, it is initially
presumed valid; after eighteen months have passed, however, the trusteeship
is automatically presumed invalid.
Section 306 saves all other rights and remedies at law or in equity with the
proviso that when the Secretary files an action in a district court, exclusive
jurisdiction over the trusteeship shall vest in that court.114
112. Presumably, the criminal sanctions can, be applied, without a members' complaint,.
by the Attorney General. But see the strange omission of § 303 from among those sections
where responsibility for investigation has been delegated to the Attorney General. [Fiscal
Year 1959-1960] BLMR ANN. REP. 60.
113. Perhaps the most striking example of jurisdictional frustration was the attempt
of the Philadelphia-Delaware Local of the International Union of Operating Engineers
to challenge that trusteeship in the federal courts. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
420-33 (1958); BLMR, T-0011 (Operating Engineers, Local 542, Philadelphia, Pa.).
After 14 exasperating years, Local 542's suspended president committed suicide. Velie, At-
tention Congress: Consider the Death of Roy Underwood, Reader's Digest, August 1959,
p. 35 ; 105 CONG. REc. A 6913-14 (Daily ed. August 11, 1959).
The litigation on jurisdictional questions tells its own, story: Underwood v. Maloney,
152 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 245 F2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957); Underwood v.
Maloney, 170 F. Supp. 21 (D. Del. 1958), aff'd, 256 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 864 (1958) ; Underwood v. McBride, 182 F. Supp. 361 (D. Del. 1960) ; Dawson
v. Delaney, 189 F. Supp. 416 (D. Del. 1960).
114. See generally Summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights
and Remedies, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 119 (1961).
1962] 1477
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Trusteeship Defined
The coverage of Title III is determined by the definition contained in
section 3(h) of the LMRDA:
"Trusteeship" means any receivership, trusteeship or other method of
supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the
autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution
or bylaws. 115
The phrasing of this definition indicates that it was meant to be read broad-
ly, but just what is encompassed within "other methods of supervision or con-
trol" is unclear. The courts may also be faced with problems in determining
the reach of the phrase "suspends the autonomy otherwise available." The
statute plainly includes the typical trusteeship: the international appoints a
trustee, receiver, or administrator who suspends the autonomy of the local
officers, directs the local's finances, and generally makes the policy decisions
for the local. But the international representative may exercise supervision or
control without assuming all the indicia of a trustee's role. Some internationals
have sent "investigators" or "monitors" to a problem local to direct and guide
the local officers without initially suspending them. However, such investiga-
tors or monitors may be authorized to impose a formal trusteeship at a mo-
ment's notice, either on their own initiative or by a telephone call to the inter-
national president. With the threat of imminent removal over them, elected
local officers can hardly dissent to the directions of the international. 16 Despite
the control provided by such supervisors, at least one international, the Car-
penters Union, 117 has argued that no trusteeship exists until the autonomy of
the local is officially suspended. If this specious attempt to limit section 3(h)
succeeds, an international could adopt informal national office supervision
to control recalcitrant locals; to avoid such results, a trusteeship should be
found to exist "Is whenever the monitor-investigator takes any positive action
which directly affects the internal affairs of the local, or its political machinery, as
when the monitor-investigator calls off a membership meeting, insists on ap-
proval of disbursements, or suspends the local's newspaper.,19
115. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (Supp. II 1961).
116. The mere presence of a receiver or trustee is of great weight and influence on the
membership who are selecting the delegates. I do not think I have to labor that oar
very much. Merely having that kind of fellow around the place is not conducive to
an expression of free will. The union members know he is there. They know he is
going to be there for 18 months. They are thinking of what can be done on job
assignments and job referrals. Senators know what I mean. I do not have to spell
it out. His influence is there if he does not say a word about the selection of delegates.
105 CONG. Rc. 6680 (1959) (Sen. Dodd); LEG. HIsT. LMRDA 1207.
117. See Horowitz, Possible Effects of LMRDA's Trusteeship Provisions, in SYm-
POSiUM ON LMRDA 458, 464 (Carpenters' Union).
118. The Bureau has not made any policy public, but the author has been informed
in conversations with members of the Bureau staff that it is attempting to follow a policy
similar to the one here outlined.
119. Under some circumstances, his mere presence might constitute a trusteeship if he
remained on, the local scene for an extended period of time; however, the mere fact that a
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The application of section 3(h) is more difficult when the international
removes elements of local autonomy without using the medium of an extraor-
dinary representative on the local scene. The international apparatus reaches
down to the local level through district directors, joint councils, and interna-
tional representatives or business agents, whose official functions may range
from centralized control over a number of locals, to liaison between local and
international, and to serving as the equivalent of a single local officer. 20 What-
ever the purported function, it is obvious that they speak with the authority of
the international, and in matters of concern to the international their insistence
that the local make a particular decision is backed by the stated or implied
threat of a trusteeship. 121 The local's newspaper may arouse the ire of the
district director, who may demand that the local officers suspend publication
of the newspaper for six weeks.' 22 If they balk, he may suspend publication
himself by getting a trusteeship imposed. Or he may induce the local officers
to cease publication by simply threatening to obtain a trusteeship which will
suspend the local officers entirely. In any case, the result is the same: the local
is no longer running a newspaper. This does not mean that any exertion of
influence by the international, or even an outright threat to impose a trustee-
ship, necessarily comes within the scope of section 3(h). But "Trusteeship"
under section 3 (h) should not be limited by labels, nor by the necessity of
finding an individual present who is indentifiable as a trustee.
Section 3(h) further requires a determination that the act of the interna-
tional "suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body un-
der its constitution or bylaws." Thus, there still is no "Trusteeship" unless
the suspension of the local's newspaper deprives the local of such autonomy.
The measure of autonomy otherwise available should be gleaned from such
sources as the local's charter, the international constitution, the legitimate ob-
jects of a trade union, and the normal practices of other locals in the same
international. Most local charters and international constitutions are permissive
and assume the existence of many implied powers in the local.' 23 Thus, if a
special auditor from the international comes to inspect the local's books, or that an inter-
national representative arrives to advise the local during contract negotiations, should not
be deemed a trusteeship.
120. See text at notes 4-7 supra.
121. Of course, some disputed issues may be decidedly of a local nature, but if both
the local and the district-level individuals appeal to the international for aid, it is predict-
able that the international representatives in the local area will win any battle of telephone
calls and will receive authorization to discipline the local or its officers.
122. Cf. Tomko v. Hilbert, 46 L.R.R.M. 2853 (W.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd on other ground,
288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961). The case was brought under Title I (Bill of Rights) and
relief was denied on the basis of the local officer's failure to exhaust "internal and ad-
ministrative" remedies under § 101 (a) (4); the facts, however, suggest problems under
Title III and the court, in denying relief, cites without elaboration two trusteeship actions
under Title III-Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Calif. 1960) and Rizzo v.
Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960), discussed at notes 217-23 infra and accompany-
ing text.
123. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (ILWU),
CONSTrruTIoN, art. V, § 1 (1961), which allows locals to adopt "all necessary laws for
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particular activity is not barred by the charter or constitution, it should be
considered an autonomous power of the local, unless such activity is not with-
in the normal practices of other locals in the international or cannot be con-
sidered a legitimate object of a trade union. If the international suspends a
power falling within the general area of implied powers, Title III should
apply.
All the definitional problems of section 3(h) are sharply displayed when
the international tampers with the very existence of the local. How courts
will respond to schemes such as revoking a rebel local's charter and reissuing
the charter to a more friendly group will determine whether Title III repre-
sents any real protection for local autonomy.
The case of Baltimore Local 28, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers,124 exemplifies the use of revocation and reissuance of a local's char-
ter to impose international control and the ease with which revocation-reis-
suance can be used to achieve the same objectives as a formal trusteeship. In
fact, in this case, they were used interchangably. A faction led by Eveson and
Parks won the presidency and the executive board of the local in the 1958
elections, but the former leadership, the King faction, retained the posts of
financial secretary and business agent. When Eveson requested that the inter-
national investigate the local's financial affairs, because the financial secretary
refused to cooperate with the executive board, the IBEW plunged Local 28
into a formal trusteeship. 125 The trustee "ruled with an iron hand, sided with
the King faction [and] removed Eveson from office."'1 6 By October 1959, the
financial conflicts which had led to the imposition of the trusteeship gave way
to a new reason for its continuance: "factionalism.' 27 The local executive
local government which do not conflict with this Constitution or with the decisions adopted
by the convention of this International, or with the decisions reached through any Inter-
national referendum," and makes no mention of whether, for example, a local may publish
its own newspaper. See also Automobile Workers, CONSTITUTION, art. 36, § 7 (1959) :
"Each subordinate body shall strive to attain the objectives set forth in this Constitution;
to maintain free relations with other organizations; to do all in its power to strengthen
and promote the labor movement," but which also specifically allows local unions to pub-
lish their own newspapers, which, however "shall conform with the policies of this Inter-
national Union." Id. at art. 28, § 8.
124. The facts in this case may be derived from the following progressive series of
cases: BLMR, T-0317 (IBEW, Local 28, Baltimore, Md.); Executive Bd., Local 28,
IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md. May 11, 1960);
Local 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 194 F. Supp. 491
(D. Md. April 24, 1961) ; Local 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 194 F. Supp. 494 (D. Md. May 16, 1961); Local 28, IBEW v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 197 F. Supp. 99 (D. Md. August 14, 1961) ; Parks v. IBEW; Local 28,
IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. March 7, 1962),
supplementary opinion, 203 F. Supp. 313 (D. Md. March 30, 1962) ; appeal docketed, No.
8649, 4th Cir.
125. 184 F. Supp. at 650-51. The trusteeship went into effect February 9, 1959. BLMIR,
T-0317.
126. 203 F. Supp. at 298.
127. Supervision of this Local Union is being continued because it was ascertained
after the assumption of supervision that the factionalism in the Local Union has
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board filed suit in a federal district court to set aside the trusteeship. A motion
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that section 304 required such pro-
ceedings to be brought through the Secretary of Labor was overruled.128 On
August 5, 1960, before the case went to trial-and just after the trusteeship's
eighteenth month-the international lifted the trusteeship.129 The Eveson
faction then swept the 1960 local elections and set out to negotiate the local's
collective bargaining agreement with the Maryland Chapter of the National
Electrical Contractors' Association (NECA, Md.).130 The IBEW locals gen-
erally had a "Council clause" in their agreements with NECA affiliates;
such clauses required the local and the employer to submit all unsettled dis-
putes to the bipartite Council of international and NECA representatives.
The clauses varied, but the International preferred the "evergreen" type, in
which even the local's right to terminate the agreement might be a dispute to
be submitted to the Council, and in which the Council claimed and exercised
the power to write contracts for the locals and the chapters as it saw fit.131
The local 28-NECA, Md. contract was ambiguous, but rather than go to the
Council, which would likely interpret it as an "evergreen" clause, 13 2 the local
went to court and obtained an interpretation that its contract clause included
the right to terminate unilaterally. 133 On June 13, 1961, Local 28 voted 740 to
79 to strike, and so informed International President Freeman, who refused to
give his consent.13 4 Local 28 struck. The international, this time eschewing
the formal trusteeship, revoked Local 28's charter in the international and
issued a charter to Local 24. About thirty recently resigned officers of Balti-
prevented the officers thereof from properly organizing the electrical industry within
the jurisdiction.
BLMR, T-0317 (Report dated Oct. 14, 1959).
128. Executive Bd., Local 28, IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 184 F.
Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960).
129. BLMR, T-0317 (Termination Report).
130. 203 F. Supp. at 299.
131. The dispute involving the Council and the evergreen clause is discussed in Local
28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 194 F. Supp. 491 (D. Md.
1961) ; Local 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 194 F. Supp.
494 (D. Md. 1961) ; Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers; Local 28, IBEW v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 F. Supp. 288, 297-98 (D. Md. 1962).
132. See 203 F. Supp. at 298.
133. Local 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 194 F.
Supp. 494 (D. Md. 1961).
134. Whether the International President's permission was needed for Local 28 to
strike, after termination of the local contract, because of art. XVII, § 13 of the IBEW
constitution, requiring such permission for any "stoppage of work in any controversy of a
general nature," was a matter on which there was an honest difference of opinion. Al-
though a strong case could be made for the existence of such a requirement, it is also true
that:
Other locals had engaged in strikes without prior consent of the IP. Frequently no
disciplinary action of any kind had been taken. This was the first case where the
charter of a local had ever been revoked.
203 F. Supp. at 304.
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more NECA affiliates applied for a charter for Local 24. From its inception
the new local was dominated by the international, which sent in international
representatives to help the carefully chosen leaders and lent Local 24, 25,000
dollars without interest. Local 24 quickly negotiated a new agreement with the
Maryland NECA Chapter and started on a course to supplant and destroy
Local 28, whose members had voted 991 to 2 to support their local leaders. 135
Local 28 and a group of members filed companion suits, 136 putting forth three
arguments: revocation of the charter was a violation of the IBEW con-
sitution for which a federal remedy was available under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley) ;137 revocation with its
consequent loss of welfare rights was unreasonable and unjust discipline violat-
ing individual rights under section 101 (a) (5) ;138 and revocation was a subter-
fuge for a trusteeship, violating the provisions of Title III. The court found
that International President Freeman resorted to revocation reissuance primarily
to control the negotiations in the Baltimore area and to rid himself of the trouble-
some leadership of Local 28, and further found that this drastic step was taken
without a fair hearing. Holding that such actions constituted a breach of
the international constitution as well as unjust discipline violating the members'
due process rights under section 101 (a) (5) of Title I, the court ordered the
IBEW to disband Local 24 and reinstate Local 28 with all its former rights. 3
Having found for Local 28 on the first two grounds, the court did not
explore the claim that revocation-reissuance was a subterfuge for trusteeship.
"It is possible," said the court, "for revocation to be used as a means of evad-
ing the trusteeship provisions in Sec. 301 et seq. But the evidence in this case
does not support the contention that it was so used."'140 This language sug-
gests that a court squarely faced with the problem might subject revocation-
reissuance to the requirements of Title III. For revocation-reissuance is
closely tied, functionally and historically, to the trusteeship as a method of
union discipline.141 Because it may be used to accomplish almost any dis-
135. The history and nature of Local 24 are described in 203 F. Supp. at 304-05. Local
28's charter was revoked on August 1, 1961; the vote of confidence was held on August 5;
the new charter to Local 24 was issued on August 27.
136. Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers; Local 28, IBEW v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962).
137. Plaintiffs argued that the federal court had jurisdiction to interpret the inter-
national's constitution in a suit between a local and an international under § 301(a) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1958). See discussion in note 149 infra.
138. 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (Supp. 11 1961).
139. Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers; Local 28, IBEW v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962), supplementary opinion, 203 F.
Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1962).
140. 203 F. Supp. at 295.
141. The power to place a local into trusteeship and the power to revoke its charter
are often found in the same paragraph of union constitutions and both can be exercised on
the basis of the same finding of facts. Electrical Workers (IUE), CONSTITUTION, art.
XVII, § A (1961) ; Steelworkers, CONSTITUTION, art. IX, § 1 (1960); International Long-
1482 [Vol. 71 :1460
THE TRUSTEESHIP IMBROGLIO
ciplinary objective of the formal trusteeship-at least in some international
unions 4 2 -a finding by the Secretary 143 or the courts that revocation-reis-
suance is beyond the purview of section 3 (h) would seriously undermine the
scope and operation of Title III. The language of section 3(h)---"any other
method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the
autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body"--is broad enough to
include the revocation of a local's charter and the reissuance of a new one
as a means of control. And when the international, in renumbering local
charters, emerges with more power and the local membership with less, 144
it seems clear that autonomy otherwise available has been suspended.145
shoreman's Association (ILA), CONSTITUTIOx, art. XII, § 4 (1959). In some unions,
there appear to be no differences whatsoever, e.g., where the trusteeship is accomplished by
revoking the local charter and setting up a "provisional government." Mine Workers,
CONSrruTIoN, art. III, § 2 (1960).
142. Revocation of charter in some trades may simply mean that the local will affiliate
with another international, e.g., Steelworkers to Iron Workers, or Machinists to Auto
Workers. But in many areas, such as the building trades, there is no other international
to which the local may tur. Revocation is normally a death blow to such a local, for it
ceases to be a part of the local Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-
CIO. Other trades will not respect the banished local's picket lines, and because of the
normal hiring hall practices, which give priority to those who have passed the internation-
al's examination for journeyman. the independent local will wither away, if it is not killed
outright. In the Local 28 situation, it was very unlikely that the local could have main-
tained an independent existence if it had lost the legal battle. See Parks v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers; Local 28, IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 F.
Supp. 288, at 310. Similarly, there is no escaping the IBEW for construction electricians,
no piping installed without a Plumbers' card, nor bulldozers driven without membership
in the Operating Engineers.
143. The Secretary may be forced to determine whether a set of facts constitutes a
trusteeship because a member or subordinate body has filed a § 304(a) complaint. In at
least six instances the Secretary has made such a determination that a § 3(h) trusteeship
did not exist; unfortunately, these determinations and the facts surrounding them have
not been made public. See notes 174-75 infra. The Secretary must also determine the indicia
of a trusteeship when an international refuses to file a report under § 301(a) or files under
protest.
144. In the Local 28 case, the electricians on NECA jobs in Baltimore had a 1400-
member local with elected officers in July 1961. These officers were negotiating with the
employers, their negotiation policies had been endorsed by the membership, and the mem-
bers had welfare benefits in both the local and the international. Two months later, elec-
tricians on NECA jobs in Baltimore had a local dominated by the international, with
"carefully chosen leaders" elected by thirty members in a re-chartering group that even con-
tained recently resigned employers; their collective bargaining was concluded by interna-
tional representatives after "brief negotiations" and they had to forfeit the welfare benefits
of either Local 28 or of the international. Here autonomy otherwise available is gone and
certainly a method of supervision and control has been used.
145. Indeed, "suspended" never to be restored. Permanent suspensions of autonomy
were of particular concern to the McClellan Committee. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1958) ("Legislative Recommendations"). Any position that a revoca-
tion of rights of autonomy is not encompassed in the word "suspends" cannot be squared
with the evil Congress was trying to reach in enacting Title III. The shifting presumption
of § 304(c) evidences Congress' desire to limit the duration of the suspension of autonomy.
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Arguably the international has abolished one subordinate body and created a
new one; on this conceptual level, it is difficult to say the international has sus-
pended the autonomy of the "new" local; nevertheless, the members in the
jurisdiction affected find that they have less freedom of action in their "new"
local. The identity of the local union is its members, not an arbitrary number
attached to it; it is the continuing exercise of autonomy by these members
which Congress sought to protect in Title III. Given Congress' awareness of the
variety of techniques that could be used to control a local, and its use of pur-
posely broad language in section 3 (h)-any "other method of suppression or
control"-it seems clear that a "Trusteeship" is not limited by traditional usage,
but may encompass any device employed to suppress local autonomy. When an
international is successful in switching charters on a local membership without
causing a schism, and the members emerge without local bargaining rights, or
without their elected officers, or without the right to elect certain officials,
a Title I "Trusteeship" should be found to exist.146 The same conclusion
could be reached where an international imposes a merger on the local. 147 When
146. Under this formulation, maneuvering such as the Operating Engineers employed
in supplanting Local 125 with Local 130, see text at notes 72-76 supra, would come within
the reach of Title III.
147. For "other methods of supervision or control" that might be used, see notes 37-
39, 115-23 supra and accompanying text. Courts used to traditional instances of trustee-
ships may find it difficult to realize that § 3(h) greatly broadens the scope of "Trustee-
ships" in the Title III sense, and may mechanically dismiss Title III claims based on "other
methods." The one merger case reported so far, Brewery Bottlers Union v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 49 L.R.R.M. 2712 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), displays this tendency. There the
plaintiff local, with a membership about equal to the combined memberships of six others,
was merged with them on the basis of a vote of the combined membership of all seven locals,
although the members of the plaintiff local had voted overwhelmingly against it. The plain-
tiff argued that its merger constituted "a method of supervision or control" within the
meaning of § 3(h) and as such had been instituted for an improper purpose under § 302.
The court answered:
Congress has not denied a labor organization the right to merge local unions. Were
the Court to adopt plaintiffs' definition of a trusteeship as urged here, the right of a
labor organization to merge locals would be permitted only ". . . for the purpose of
correcting corruption or financial malpractice . . ." [sic] Sec. 302 L.M.R.D.A., 73
Stat. 531. Such an interpretation would effectively frustrate the power of a labor
organization to merge subordinate local unions. Nothing in the legislative history
indicates a Congressional intent to curb, limit or render ineffective the power to
direct merger.
Id. at 2715. The court's bare conclusion, unsupported by rational grounds, accompanied by
a quotation of § 302 that twisted its meaning by omitting the crucial phrases "assuring the
performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining represen-
tative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of
such labor organization," must be considered an ipse dixit, offering no value as a precedent.
Thus the question of mergers is still open. The importance of closing off avenues of evasion
of Title III and the potential danger of not doing so are demonstrated by the fact that it was
just prior to this merger attempt that the Teamsters amended their constitution in 1961




the expelled local assumes an independent existence, the autonomy of at least
some of the members is not impaired. These facts tend to militate against Title
III coverage. 148 In the true schism situation a remedy may still be available un-
der section 101 (a) (5), or through a suit on the union constitution, either in
a state court 149 or perhaps in a federal court under section 301 of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act.1r0
148. When a schism takes place, two separate labor organizations result and the trus-
teeship terminology cannot generally be applied to the separated local. See note 67 supra.
The Local 28 situation, however, probably does constitute a Trusteeship because, while the
local managed to maintain a separate existence during the litigation period, it is extremely
doubtful that it could have continued as an independent. See note 142 mpra.
149. State courts have long enforced the relationship between a local and its interna-
tional. Harker v. McKissock, 10 N.J. Super. 26, 76 A.2d 89 (1950) ; International Union
of Brewery Workers v. Becherer, 142 N.J. Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16 (1948), aff'd, 4 N.J. Super.
456, 67 A.2d 900 (1949), cert. denied, 3 N.J. 374, 70 A.2d 537 (1950) ; Vilella v. McGrath,
136 Conn. 645, 74 A.2d 187 (1950). They have often analogized the union constitution or
charter to a contract, Suifridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1948) ; Clark v. FitzGerald,
197 Misc. 355, 93 N.Y.S.2d 768, 773 (1949) ; Local 1140 v. United Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers, 232 Minn. 217, 45 N.W.2d 408 (1950). The results of such an interpretation
have varied according to the relative strength of local and international at any given
time. Thus, at the end of the last century, the contract was read in favor of local
autonomy. See, e.g., Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N.Y. 232, 29 N.E. 139 (1891). With the in-
creasing trend to centralization in this century, courts generally read the contract to favor
the international. See, e.g., Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal. App. 2d 781, 180 P.2d 982 (1947) ;
Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1949). In recent years, however, the trend has
partially shifted back, led by the New Jersey courts. International Brewery Workers v.
Becherer, supra. With the increased emphasis on union democracy and with the discovery
of Communism and corruption in some unions, some other courts have followed the
trend to favoring locals, especially in schism situations where the local has attempted
to leave an international. See Crocker v. Weil, 361 P.2d 1014 (Ore. 1961) ; Madden v.
Atkins, N.Y.S.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958) ; Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d
452 (1948) ; id., 192 Misc. 603, 81 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1948) ; id., 194 Misc. 138, 86 N.Y.S.2d
209 (1949).
For discussions of the shifting trends, see Isaacson, The Local Union and the Interna-
tional, N.Y.U. 2D ANN. CONF. oN LAB. 493 (1950); id., N.Y.U. 5TH ANN. CONF. o N La.
413 (1952) ; Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
YALE L.J. 175 (1960) ; Summers, Union Schism in Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double
Standards, and Projected Answers, 45 VA. L. REv. 261 (1959). The divergent attitudes
are reflected in various holdings denying the entity status of the local, see International
Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones Constr. Co., 240 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1951) ; Suff-
ridge v. O'Grady, supra, or the international see International Brewery Workers v.
Becherer, supra; Harker v. McKisock, supra.
150. The court's holding that it had jurisdiction over the suit under § 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958),
foreshadowed by its discussion of the point at a preliminary stage of the case, 197 F. Supp.
99, 106 (1961), adds a new dimension to the debate over that section. Section 301 provides
in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF TITLE I1 11;
As of the effective date of the act, September 14, 1959, forty-sL interna-
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and
shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
Most of the debate heretofore has centered on the phrase "contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization." The purpose of the section was primarily to eliminate
difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction over unions, but in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme Court held, partly to avoid the constitutional
objections that might arise from providing federal jurisdiction over questions of state law,
that § 301 authorized the federal courts to fashion a body of substantive law covering
employer-union contracts. The wisdom of the section and of this holding has been ques-
tioned by commentators who fear involving the federal courts in areas beyond their com-
petence. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957). This holding has nevertheless become well-
established.
Since that time the Supreme Court has further held that state courts are not divested
of jurisdiction by § 301, Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), although they
must apply federal law, Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), and
has held that "contracts between an employer and a labor organization" are not limited to
collective bargaining agreements, Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
The phrase "contracts . . . between any such labor organizations" has not been much
litigated. The starting point is clear: both the reasons for granting jurisdiction-difficulty
of otherwise obtaining it-and the reasons against involving the courts in the area-doubts
as to their competence-are present in internal union suits as well as employer-union suits.
In United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), the
phrase was held to encompass no-raiding pacts between unions, and it has been argued that
this should be the sole meaning attributed to the phrase. Note, Applying the "Contracts
Between Labor Organizations" Clause of Taft-Hartley Section 301: A Plea For Restraint,
69 YALE L.J. 299 (1959). But in Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, 42 L.R.R.M. 2818 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), the court denied a motion to dismiss a local's
suit to enforce its constitution against the international based on the international's argu-
ment that § 301 did not give jurisdiction to intervene in inernal union affairs. The case was
eventually settled, so there was no holding on the point.
It is fairly well settled that a local union is a "labor organization," NLRB v. Indiana
& Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1941), aff'd, 318 U.S. 9 (1943), and that a union
constitution is a contract, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958) ; cf. state cases cited in note 149 supra. On the other hand, it may be argued that
whatever the "plain meaning" of these words, they do not have the meaning in the context
of § 301, and they cannot support a holding that Congress intended by § 301 passed in 1947
as part of the Taft-Hartley Act to regulate internal union affairs. Of course, by the passage
of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, Congress has now shown an intention to regulate in-
ternal union affairs by legislation, but unless the existence of legislative regulation has a
role in determining the scope of the judicial creativity involved in § 301, Landrum-Griffin
cannot be easily read back into § 301.
The situation in the Local 28 case may present a median situation because of the schism
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tionals 15 2 reported 492 active trusteeships :153 460 over local unions '5 and
32 over districts or other intermediate bodies. These totals, however, do not
necessarily indicate the amount of effective international control, since the
international leadership may be able to dissipate widespread dissent by placing
a trusteeship over a single key local, and since the size of membership in
local unions varies greatly. 55
that occurred. The case might be distinguished from a traditional internal union discipline
case, and the reach of T-H § 301 narrowed accordingly, by the fact that at the time of the
case, the local was no longer part of the international; thus, even under a view which
counselled reluctance to allow federal courts to intervene in internal union affairs, this case
might involve a suit over a contract "between any such [separate] labor organizations."
For a more extensive discussion, of the T-H § 301 problem, see the Note to be published
in a forthcoming issue of the Yale Law Journal.
151. The statistics contained in the following paragraphs are drawn from raw data
supplied by the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports, with a cut-off date of November
30, 1961. BLMR, UNOFFICIAL FIGUREs, Nov. 30, 1961. See note 46 supra. Charts summariz-
ing this data are included in Appendix at 1522-26. The interpretations and charts are entirely
the responsibility of the author and the Yale Law Journal.
152. The method used in determining these figures accords with BLMR practice'in
counting the AFL-CIO as an international where locals directly affiliated to that body are
involved and counting District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America separately from
its parent.
The unique status of District 50 justifies treating it as a separate international. See
Ragland v. UMW, 188 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
What is District 50? It can be instantly answered that: (a) it is not a district, (b)
it is not number 50, and (c) it is not a miners' union. It is an organization, dedicated
to the task of grabbing membership in any field or industry not securely nailed down
by some other powerful union.
ROE, JUGGERNAUT 195 (1949).
153. Levitan, Union Trusteeships: The Federal Law and an Inventory, 11 LAB. L.J.
1067, 1076 (1960), finds a total of 508; however, that figure includes 21 "trusteeships"
reported by the Railway Supervisors which admittedly need not have been counted, id. at
1077, and which have been dropped from the BLMR's figures since then. Discounting these
21, the figure of 492 is 5 higher than Levitan's; the most plausible explanation is that this
results from some very delinquent reporting by some union. after Levitan's cutoff date of
June 14, 1960. Minor discrepancies may result from individual reporting practices. See
note 55 supra.
154. Including 22 locals in Canada and one unit of an amalgamated local in the Auto-
mobile Workers. District 50, for two of its reported trusteeships, does not give a date of
imposition; therefore, the addition of subclasses will ordinarily give a total of 458.
155. The only local in trusteeship in the Mailers' Union contained over twenty per
cent of the international's membership, BLMR, T-0664 (Mailers, Local 14, Philadelphia,
Pa.). The International Mailers' Union has 4,500 members in 70 locals. 1 ExcYc. OF As-
SOcIATIONs: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE U.S. 655 (3d ed. 1961). Philadelphia
Mailers' Union No. 14 has approximately 900 members. Sagot, "Appeals from the De-
cisions of the IMU Executive Council to the International Mailers Union Convention:
Addendum 1," at 11 (Aug. 21, 1961).
The *Operating Engineers' trusteeship over Local 3 in San Francisco suspended the
autonomy of twelve per cent of the international membership. In 1959, the International
Union of Operating Engineers had 200,000 members. ExcYc. Am. Ass'N 453 (2d ed. 1959).
Local 3 had 22,000 members. Mangum, One Union's Experience Under LMRDA Titles
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According to reports filed, eleven unions had ten or more active trusteeships
when the act became effective:
Union No. of Locals 1r, No. of Trusteeships
District 50, UMWA unknown 122 locals
Carpenters 2900 68 locals, 6 districts
Teamsters 888 55 locals, 1 dist.
Mine Workers unknown 15 locals, 21 dist.
Steelworkers 2853 21 locals
Bakery & Confectionery Workers 319 18 locals
Hotel, Restaurant Employees 602 17 locals, 1 dist.
Electrical Workers (IBEW) ° 1700 13 locals
Laundry Workers 149 12 locals
Brick & Clay Workers 350 9 locals, 2 dist.
Automobile Workers 1255 10 locals
Congress, in enacting Title III, expressed concern over the duration of
trusteeships; this concern underlies the enactment of the presumption of in-
validity after eighteen months. A breakdown of the initial trusteeship reports
shows that nearly two-thirds of all trusteeships were more than eighteen
months old:
Length of Trusteeship
as of Sept. 14,1959 Locals Districts
6 months or less 72 1
6 to 18 months 98 3
18 months to 3 years 83 2
3 to 5 years 96 4
5 to 10 years 77 1
10 to 15 years 22 2
15 to 20 years 9 2
over 20 years 1 17
Totals 458 32
Some internationals, indeed, had many trusteeships in force for over five years,
such as District 50 of UMW with 60 such trusteeships and the Teamsters with
24. But the longevity prize went directly to the United Mine Workers: One
local had been in trusteeship since February 1940,157 seventeen districts had
I-IV, in Symposium ON LMRDA 1165, 1166. For the sordid situation under this trustee-
ship, see S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 383-404 (1958).
The trusteeship by the Air Line Pilots Association over the intermediate Air Line
Stewards and Stewardesses Association affects over one-third of the ALPA's member-
ship, BLMR, T-0617 (Air Line Pilots, Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses). The ALPA
has 21,747 members of whom 8,000 are in the subordinate ALSSA. 1 ExcYc. OF AssocIA-
TIONS: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE U.S. 650 (3d ed. 1961).
On the other hand, membership in other unions, like the Teamsters, Steelworkers, or
Carpenters is widely dispersed.
156. ENcyc. AM. Ass'N 452-59 (2d ed. 1959).
157. No one remembered what day. BLMR, T-0048 (Mine Workers, Local 160,
Shamokin, Pa.).
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been in trusteeships for over twenty years, and four more for over ten years. 5 '
The enactment of Title III induced many internationals to terminate their
longstanding trusteeships,6 9 but had little effect on others. 160
In overall figures, 288 locals had been in trusteeships for over eighteen
months at the date of the act: however, 175 of these were terminated within
six months of this date, 161 83 others have since been discontinued, and finally,
28 were still in trusteeship as of November 30, 1961. Of the 170 locals in
trusteeships for under eighteen months in September 1959, 154 were ter-
minated, 16 2 but 16 were still in force in November 1961. In addition, of the
32 district trusteeships, only the 21 of the Mine Workers remain. Combining
totals, 44 locals and 21 districts under trusteeships when the title became
law were still in that status some twenty-six months later.
During the twenty-six month period of the title's operation, 51 internation-
als have imposed a total of 241 new trusteeships over locals and 5 over
districts. The leaders in the incidence of trusteeship are:
Union No. of locals 163 No. of Trusteeships
Imposed in 26 months
since enactment
Steelworkers 2995 47 locals
Automobile Workers 1286 38 locals 164
Hotel, Restaurant Employees 564 20 locals, 1 district
Boilermakers 475 10 locals
Chemical workers 567 9 locals
Teamsters 890 8 locals
Although it is too early for a conclusive test, apparently most internationals
are trying to terminate new trusteeships within eighteen months.'6 5 Of the
246 trusteeships imposed since Title III, 105 have been discontinued. Of the
158. BLMR, T-0014 through T-0034.
159. See, e.g., District 50 where local autonomy came suddenly: 111 trusteeships were
terminated within three months and the entire 122 within six months. Furthermore, al-
though District 50 established six trusteeships after the act went into effect, all were
terminated within eighteen months.
160. See, e.g., the parent Mine Workers where the act has had almost no effect. Of
the 21 districts and 15 locals reported in trusteeship as of September 14, 1959, only one local
had been released by November 30, 1961. BLMR, T-0014 through T-0049. The one local
released had been in trusteeship for over seven years bcause "there were no aspirants for
local union offices." BLMR, T-0045 (Mine Workers, Local 4913, Russelton, Pa.).
161. However, this includes 70 carpenter "trusteeships" released on October 22, 1959,
many of which may not have had to be reported. See note 55 supra.
162. Forty-three of the 154 ran over eighteen months before they were released.
163. 1 ENcyc. oF AssocrATIoNs: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE U.S. 650-60 (3d
ed. 1961).
164. Includes two units of amalgamated locals.
165. See Chart III. Aside from the Mine Workers, only the Steelworkers (2995 locals)
and the Textile Workers (TWUA) (654 locals) seem to be having difficulty in terminating
trusteeships before eighteen months.
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remaining 141 active trusteeships, however, 23 have been in existence for
over eighteen months.
Overall, 736 trusteeships have been reported to the Bureau during its
first twenty-six months of operation.16 6 On November 30, 1961, 206 of these
were active: 182 locals and 24 districts. Although the enactment of Title III
has evidently curtailed the use of trusteeships, the fact that many trusteeships
are not being terminated promptly is nevertheless disturbing. Eighty-eight
trusteeships were beyond the eighteen month line and 65 of these had their
autonomy suspended prior to the passage of the title. Some of these aging
trusteeships are undoubtedly justified despite their length, since some locals
may only contain a few members and others may be in extremely anti-union
localities where it is safer if only the international representative be identified
as a union man. It is not likely, however, that such explanations could justify
all 88 of these trusteeships.
Stale trusteeships have an aversion to investigation and public disclosure,
as the reaction to both the McClellan hearings and the reporting provisions of
section 301 have shown.' 67 The problem of protracted trusteeships today has
considerably narrowed in number and it certainly would not be beyond the
capacity of the Bureau to investigate systematically and to publicize the cir-
cumstances surrounding these long-term trusteeships.168 Such investigation
by the Bureau might be expected to reduce considerably the number of aging
trusteeships. But this possible inducement to compliance has been ignored, and
thus individual complaints are the sole impetus for enforcement.
AN OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT
When a union member or a subordinate body files a complaint with the
Secretary, alleging a violation of either section 302 or 303, the Secretary is
required by the mandate of section 304(a) to investigate the complaint to
determine if there is probable cause to believe that the violation has occurred
and, if he finds probable cause, to commence an action in a federal court.160
All investigations are handled by the Office of Compliance and Enforcement
166. This total includes 699 locals, including 36 Canadian locals and 3 units of amal-
gamated UAW locals, and 37 districts.
167. The reports required under § 301 do not present detailed descriptions of individual
trusteeships. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a report is required is an inducement to
terminate. See note 55 supra.
168. The BLMR dearly has the power to make such investigation. See note 169 infra.
169. If there is any reason to believe that a trusteeship is being improperly reported,
or not being reported at all, under § 301(a), the Secretary may initiate his own investiga-
tion. By the force of § 301(b), the Secretary is given powers of investigation and enforce-
ment as contained in Title II (Reporting by Labor Organizations, Officers and Employees
of Labor Organizations, and Employers) which does not require as a prerequisite a com-
plaint by a member or subordinate body. Enforcement of §§ 302 and 303 by the Secretary
under § 304 is limited to those cases where the Secretary is acting pursuant to a complaint
by a member or subordinate body. A reading of § 304(a), in isolation, might make it
appear that investigations into possible violations of §§ 302 and 303 are also limited to cases
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of the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports. 170 The most recent figures
available on investigations under Title III have a cut-off date of July 25,
1961.171 These figures show 114 investigations :172 50 under section 301, the
reporting provision, 50 under section 302, the provision governing the validity
of trusteeships, and 14 under section 303, the antimilking and voting provision.
Of the 50 investigations begun under section 301, 16 were on the Bureau's
own initiative and the remainder resulted from individual complaints-32 al-
leging failure to file any trusteeship report and 2 claiming that reports filed
were false. "Voluntary compliance" from the international was obtained in 27
investigations,17 and 13 were dropped-including the 2 false-report complaints
-when the investigation failed to substantiate the charges. Ten section 301
investigations were pending as of the cutoff date.
Eight of the 50 investigations initiated upon a complaint of a union member
under section 302 were still open, but the other 42 had been closed. In six of
these 42, it was determined that there was no trusteeship within the definition
of section 3(h). In 11 investigations, no violation of section 302 was found to
exist. The remaining 25 investigations under section 302 were "concluded"
when the trusteeship was terminated during or immediately after the investiga-
tion. The Bureau, except in one case,174 has not made the facts surrounding
where the Secretary has received a complaint from a member or subordinate organization.
However, § 601(a) of Title VI (Miscellaneous Provisions) provides:
The Secretary shall have power when he believes it necessary in order to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision, of this Act
(except Title I or amendments made by this Act to other statutes) to make an in-
vestigation....
The net result is that although the Secretary's enforcement initiative is limited to § 301,
he can investigate any possible violation of §§ 301, 302 or 303 without a complaint from a
member or subordinate body. The proper reading of § 304(a), then, is simply that if a
member or subordinate body files a § 302 or 303 complaint, the Secretary must now in-
vestigate what he can investigate in any case.
170. [Fiscal Year 1959-60] BLMR ANN. REP. 60-61. Reports are also subject to a
"desk review" by the Office of Reports and Analysis of the BLMR and this may lead to
"correction correspondence." Ibid.
171. The statistics are unofficial ones supplied to the author by the Office of Com-
pliance and Enforcement of the BLMR. Interview with Mr. Ed Daly, Washington, D.C.,
December 28, 1961. Because investigation files are not open to the public, there is no way
of "looking behind" the categories into which the figures are divided.
172. [Fiscal Year 1960-61] BLMR ANN. REP. 7 gives a figure of 144 investigations,
which is either a misprint or involves a matter of defining what is an "investigation"; it
may include matters handled by correspondence, or matters settled by other levels of the
BLMR which do not reach the formal stage of "investigation" carried out by the Office
of Compliance and Enforcement. See note 170 supra.
173. The BLMR places emphasis upon, and great pride in, its ability to obtain, "volun-
tary compliance" from the international unions. See [Fiscal Year 1960-61] BLMR ANN.
RFP. 2-13; [Fiscal Year 1959-60] BLMR ANN. REP. 60-61.
174. The Auto Workers imposed a trusteeship over Memphis Local 988 after the local
repeatedly refused to desegregate its union hall facilities. The Bureau's investigation deter-
mined that the UAW constitution was fairly interpreted to prohibit such segregation, that
integrated facilities were a legitimate object of a union, and that, therefore, no probable
cause existed to believe the trusteeship violated the title. See note 60 supra.
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these determinations public, 175 a policy which is inadvisable because it leaves
undisturbed the fog shrouding the definition of "Trusteeship" in section 3(h)
and of "proper purpose" in section 302.
Two of the 14 investigations following section 303 complaints involved
alleged violations of the provision prohibiting the counting of votes at a con-
vention of delegates appointed by a trustee: one investigation failed to find
probable cause and the other was still pending on July 25, 1961. The other 12
investigations involved section 303's antimilking provision; eight were dis-
continued for lack of evidence and three were still pending. In the final case a
"technical violation" was found, but was not prosecuted.
176
A CLOSER VIEW OF ENFORCEMENT
By November 30, 1961, there were 65 unterminated trusteeships dating
from before passage of the act; all had seen their second birthday and several
their thirtieth. An additional 141 trusteeships, imposed after passage of the
acts, remained active; 23 of these had exceeded eighteen-months.
Up to July 25, 1961, 114 investigations had been initiated by the Bureau
under Title III :17 98 of these were on complaints received from union mem-
bers in trusteed locals or districts, and 64 of the 98 alleged violations were of
either section 302 or section 303.178
As of July 1, 1962, the Secretary had yet to institute his first enforcement
action under Title III. 17
It is not the Secretary's task under the statute to find actual violations. His
duty, instead, is emphatically described by Judge Watkins, writing in the
Local 28 case:
Under section 304(a) if the Secretary merely finds "probable cause to
believe that such a violation has occurred" (not that he finds such viola-
tion as a fact) "he shall" (not may) bring suit. 80
Although local members have formally complained in over 100 instances that
existing trusteeships violated the provisions of'Title I1,181 the Secretary has
175. Nothing prevents the Bureau from making these determinations public, as the
Memphis-UAW local case illustrates. The only limitation, is that § 304(a) bars the Secre-
tary from "disclosing the identity of the complaint" (emphasis added).
176. The act does not provide for discretion in invoking the civil remedies and criminal
penalties that attach to § 303; however, under § 304(a), if a violation is "remedied," the
Secretary need not bring a civil action.
177. Because the identity of the unions being investigated is normally kept confidential,
see note 171 supra, the complaints and investigations cannot be correlated with the dura-
tion of the trusteeship involved.
178. Were complaints and investigations to continue at the same rate, a projection. of
these figures to July 1, 1962, would show: 171 investigations initiated, on 147 membership
complaints, 96 of which alleged violations of §§ 302 or 303.
179. Telephone conversation with Commissioner John L. Holcombe, June 20, 1962.
180. Executive Bd., Local 28, IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 184 F.
Supp. 649, 656 (D. Md. 1960) (emphasis by the Court).
181. See note 178 supra and accompanying text.
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yet to find probable cause to believe that a violation exists unremedied in
even one case.182 Enforcement of these complaints has not been aided by the
fact that the provisions of Title III are not a model of clarity, that the enforce-
ment agency, the Bureau of Labor-Managment Reports, was newly created
when the act was passed, and that the circumstances of internal political con-
flict in unions are not easily uncovered. 18 The total lack of enforcement, how-
ever, would seem to indicate that something more than administrative dif-
ficulties is involved.
The explanation seems to be largely rooted in the remedy proviso of section
30 4 (a)-the Secretary need not prosecute those violations which have been
"remedied." The Bureau apparently takes the view that any violation is
automatically remedied by termination of the trusteeship.184 This interpreta-
tion was characterized by the Bureau under the heading of "mootness" in the
case of the trusteeship over Philadelphia Mailers Union No. 14.185 A com-
plaint, filed with the Bureau on February 13, 1961,186 alleged that the trustee-
ship had not been established in accordance with the constitution of the Inter-
national Mailers Union, that it had not been imposed for any proper purpose
defined in section 302, and that there were continuing improper transfers of
funds from the local's treasury in violation of section 303 (a) (2). By July
1961, further allegations had been filed that the trusteeship was not being
administered for proper purposes under section 302, and that the trusteed
local had appointed delegates to the forthcoming international convention,
where their votes, if counted, would violate section 303 (a) (1).187 Then, in
August 1961, the international convention not only approved the trusteeship
over Local 14,188 but immediately thereafter expelled the president of the local
who had filed the complaint with the Bureau.189 Four months later, a special
local election was held in which the two assistant trustees, running unop-
182. See text at note 179 supra.
183. The situation involving six locals and 22,000 members of the Hotel, Restaurant
Employees in Los Angeles affords an example of the intricacy surrounding some of these
conflicts. BLMR, T-0631 (Joint Executive Board), T-0696 (Local 440), T-0728 (Local
17).
184. Investigations are apparently "concluded" automatically when the trusteeship is
terminated. Cf. text at notes 173-74 supra.
185. BLMR, T-1664 (International Mailers' Union, Local 14, Philadelphia, Pa.). The
trusteeship was established January 16, 1961.
186. Letter from Leonard M. Sagot to Commissioner John L. Holcombe, Feb. 13, 1961,
reprinted in Sagot, "Appeals From the Decisions of the IMU Executive Council to the
IMU Convention," Addendum No. 1, at p. 13 (Aug. 13, 1961). Leonard M. Sagot, who
filed the complaint with the Secretary, was the elected President of PMU No. 14 at the
time the trusteeship was imposed.
187. Letter from Leonard M. Sagot to Commissioner Holcombe, July 7, 1961. See
also BLMR, T-0664 (Semi-annual Report, July 10, 1961, at p. 3). See also discussion of
voting by appointed delegates in text at notes 248-55 infra.
188. "Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Convention, International Mailers' Union,
August 21, 22, 23, 1961, Miami, Florida," International Mailer, No. 10, Oct. 1961, 147-48.
189. Id. at 148-49.
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posed,1' won the posts of president and secretary-treasurer. There no longer
being any need for the trusteeship as an instrument of control, it was ter-
minated eleven days later.191 The Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor-Man-
agement Reports, a few days after termination of the trusteeship, described
the status of the complaint in the Philadelphia Mailers case:
In view of the fact that the trusteeship has been terminated, the matter
is considered moot and under the circumstances, it is unlikely that an ad-
ministrative determination will be formally made in this matter. I might
mention that the fact that no determination is issued does not constitute
any conclusion that a particular trusteeship was or was not statutorily valid
or its continuance was or was not statutorily justifiable. 10 2
The Commissioner's position may be interpreted to mean either that the
trusteeship's formal termination somehow abrogates the Secretary's duty to
make an investigation to determine if there is probable cause to believe that
any violation has occurred or that termination of the trusteeship automatically
remedies any violation of Title III. No justification for the first interpreta-
tion is to be found in the act ;193 the second would wholly frustrate the pur-
pose of Congress. If mere termination of the trusteeship will moot or remedy
any violation, an international could place a trusteeship over a local one morn-
ing, loot its treasury that afternoon, and terminate the trusteeship the next day
without fear of section 303 (a) (2). Similarly, an international president could
impose trusteeships over all opposition locals, appoint their delegates to the
international convention, and then terminate all trusteeships following his
unanimous reelection before the Secretary can make any determination under
section 303 (a) (1).194
190. Letter from L. M. Sagot to author, Jan. 31, 1962, on file in Yale Law Library.
It was alleged that other members of the local "were ruled ineligible for local union office
because they had not paid their dues continuously for two years prior to said nominations;
or they had failed to attend one half of the number of union, meetings since the previous
nominations in April 1960." Ibid.
191. BLMR, T-0664 (Termination Report).
192. Letter from Commissioner Holcombe to L. M. Sagot, undated-written between
January 24, 1962, and February 5, 1962, copy on file in Yale Law Library (emphasis sup-
plied).
193. Indeed, Congress tried to provide individual members with a remedy in which
costs would be minimal and the complainant's identity could be kept a secret. Executive
Bd., Local 28, IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 184 F. Supp. 649, 656 (D.
Md. 1960). Congress' reasons for providing a remedy through the Secretary would seem
to be as compelling after formal termination, of the trusteeship as before, but compare the
final sentence of Commissioner Holcombe's letter, which implies that after termination of
the trusteeship, the aggrieved member must file his own court action and thus pay the
costs of litigation and reveal his identity. See note 192 mpra.
194. The complaint in the Philadelphia Mailers case included allegations of violations
under §§ 302, 303(a) (1), and 303(a) (2), albeit they were far from being as extreme as
those in these hypotheticals. See text at notes 249-60 infra. Complainant Sagot has never
received a determination as to any-of the allegations from the Secretary. Letter from L. M.
Sagot to author, Jan. 31, 1962; all allegations are apparently now "moot"
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Aside from these anomalous results under section 303, the assumption of the
Commissioner's apparent position that termination remedies all violations of
Title III is unwarranted, for violations of the act are not so easily remedied.
Decisions of a trustee during a trusteeship improperly established or adminis-
tered under section 302 may not always be remedied by termination-his actions
may affect the autonomy of the local long after the trusteeship is formally
terminated.
The Steelworkers' trusteeship over the Kaiser local 19i is illustrative. On
June 9, 1958, the local elected officers for a two-year term who were openly
opposed to the international leadership of President David McDonald.195 The
new officers, led by Flaherty and Yerkey, had served for less than three
months when the international imposed a trusteeship over the local on Septem-
ber 3, 1958, for the vacuous reason that: "Conditions were such, that in order
to preserve the integrity of the Union, the appointment of an administrator
was necessary."' 9 7 Flaherty repeatedly attempted to obtain relief in a federal
court on his own,198 but after 17 months of trusteeship, in February 1960, he
195. Steelworkers Local 2869, the 6000-member bargaining agent at the Fontana, Calif.
plant of the Kaiser Steel Corporation.
196. The election was held on June 9, 1958. Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544,
547 (S.D. Calif. 1959). In a three-cornered race, the Flaherty slate received 57% of the
vote with approximately two-thirds of the local membership casting ballots. Letter from
Tony Geram (attorney for the Flaherty faction) to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at p. 4, on file in
Yale Law Library. The new officers did not take office until July 1958. Letter from Tony
Geram to author, Mar. 3, 1962, at p. 1, on file in Yale Law Library. The incoming officers
were members of the nationally-organized "Dues Protest Committee." Flaherty v. Mc-
Donald, 183 F. Supp. 300, 302 (S.D. Calif. 1960). The national DPC leadership considered
control of the Kaiser local crucial. For some of the flavor of the battle then raging between
the DPC and the International Administration, see STEELWORKERS' COMrMTTEEE TO SPON-
SoR TRUTH, THE: MASK OF DECEIT: ExposiE OF THE GOALS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DUES
PROTEST COMMITTEE (DPC) LEADERS (undated), which, although national in scope, at-
tacks Flaherty, Geram, and Yerkey by name; it was distributed to members of the Kaiser
local after the 1958 election and before the imposition of the trusteeship. Letter from Tony
Geram to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at p. 3.
197. BLMR, T-0402 (Steelworkers, Local 2869, Fontana, Calif.). Vague reasons such
as this are common in the BLMR's files; trusteeship reports often merely quote the lan-
guage of § 302 as their reason for imposing the particular trusteeship. The given reasons
may be classified, but probably not fruitfully. See Levitan, Union Trusteeships: The Fed-
eral Law and an Inventory, 11 LAE. L.J. 1067, 1079 (1960). The BLMR is trying to cure
this defect and its new form for reporting trusteeships, effective Nov. 18, 1961, requires a
detailed statement explaining each reason given. BLMR, "Trusteeship Report Form LM-
15," 29 C.F.R. § 408 (1961). It remains to be seen whether any form will elicit accurate
and complete reasons from internationals imposing trusteeships.
198. Three times the plaintiffs failed to convince a federal court of its jurisdiction.
Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Calif. Nov. 18, 1959) ; Flaherty v. McDonald,
183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Calif. Jan. 5, Feb. 5, 1960) ; Flaherty v. United Steelworkers In-
ternational, 46 L.R.R.M. 3006 (S.D. Calif. July 20, 1960). See discussion in text at notes
217-23 infra. See also Flaherty v. United Steelworkers International (Calif. Super. Ct.,
No. 100713) (state damage action), filed March 25, 1960, repeatedly continued by defend-
ants, and not yet decided. Letter from T. Geram to author, March 3, 1962, at p. 3, on file
in Yale Law Library.
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filed a complaint with the Secretary alleging that the trusteeship was improper-
ly established and administered. 99 A few months later the trustee announced
that new elections would be held on June 14, 1960, preparatory to termination
of the trusteeship,20° and ruled that rebel leaders Flaherty and Yerkey, whose
two-year term had expired, could not be candidates, because they had not
"attended at least one-half of the regular meetings of [their] Local Union
... for 24 months previous," as required by the international constitution.201
Although a prompt disposition was promised by the Department of Labor,
none was forthcoming by the time of the election. 20 2 The election was held
without Flaherty or Yerkey on the ballot,203 and the trusteeship was formally
terminated.204 Barred as candidates for reelection, the local officers, while await-
ing a determination from the Secretary under Title III, pressed an internal
union appeal to have the election set aside. After losing this appeal, Flaherty
filed a Title IV (Elections) complaint with the Secretary, 205 arguing that
under the constitution regular meetings could be conducted only by the elected
local officers and that in any case the special meetings called by the trustee
were invalid because the trusteeship itself was invalid both in inception and ad-
ministration.
20 6
199. Letters from T. Geram to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at p. 7 and April 12, 1962, at
p. 1, on file in Yale Law Library.
200. Letter from T. Geram to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at p. 6.
201. Steelworkers, Co srrUTiox, art VIII, § 9(c) (1956). Letter from T. Geram
to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at p. 6.
202. In answer to an inquiry from attorney Geram received by the Department of
Labor on, April 23, 1960, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor Nelson M. Bortz, replied
on May 12, 1960: "You may be assured that we are trying to reach a decision in this mat-
ter as speedily as possible. As soon as such a decision is made, we shall notify you." As
of April 12, 1962, complainant had not received any determination on his Title III com-
plaint. Letter from T. Geram to author, April 12, 1962, at p. 1.
203. Letter from T. Geram to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at p. 7.
204. BLMR, T-0402 (Steehvorkers, Local 2869, Fontana, Calif.), Termination Report,
July 17, 1960.
205. Letter from T. Geram to author, April 12, 1962, at pp. 1-2. Section 401(e), 29
U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. II 1961), provides, in part:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a reason-
able opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every member
in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to
section 504 [prohibiting members of the Communist Party and those convicted of
certain crimes within the last five years from holding office] of this title and to rea-
sonable qualifications uniformly imposed)....
Section 401(b), 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (Supp. II 1961), provides that:
Every local labor organization shall elect its officers not less often than, once every
three years by secret ballot among the members in good standing.
These provisions are enforceable by the Secretary under § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b)
(Supp. II 1961).
206. Letter from T. Geram to author, Feb. 10, 1962, at pp. 6-7. On this point, the
rebels' case in the Kaiser local is stronger than that in PMU No. 14, see note 190 supra,
because the Steelworkers' attendance requirement includes only "regular" meetings of the
local, while the Mailers requirement includes regular or special meetings. International
Mailers Union, By-LAws, art. XVIII (Jan. 1960).
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Commissioner Holcombe issued a narrow determination on the Title IV
complaint, holding simply that the meeting attendance requirement "does not,
on its face, appear to be unreasonable." 20 7 But the complainants had not
argued that the requirement was unreasonable "on its face"; rather their argu-
ment was that no regular or valid meetings could be held when the local was
under an invalid trusteeship. Indeed, the Commissioner noted that the Title IV
complaint involved the validity of the trusteeship.20 8 Nevertheless, the Com-
missioner apparently believed that the validity of the meetings under the
trusteeship was irrelevant in a Title IV complaint and could only be challenged
through the Title III complaint. 20 9 Yet, no determination was issued on the
Title III complaint;210 presumably it is considered "moot" after the formal
termination of the trusteeship.
By supplying a remedy through the Secretary, Congress believed that local
autonomy could be quickly restored.211 But the Philadelphia Mailers case and
the Kaiser case, the longstanding trusteeships that are still in force, some of
which were imposed before the enactment of the LMRDA, and the number
of complaints filed under Title III show that the Bureau has not moved swiftly
in trusteeship cases.212 Trusteeship complaints have a political urgency about
them that requires quick action. It is probable that they are often initiated by
the suspended local officers whose term of office is usually short and in any case
cannot exceed three years.212a Such complainants assuredly do not hold power
at the international level and the real issue at stake is whether they will be able
to maintain their political base in their home locals. If the local officers can be
effectively prevented from regaining control of the local, the reason for the
trusteeship may disappear. Whatever overall proportion of trusteeships are
207. Letter from Commissioner Holcombe to Thomas Flaherty (undated).
208. Your contention appears to be that certain of the meetings were not lawfully held
because of the imposition of a trusteeship, the legality of which you question.
Ibid.
209. The issues are whether or not the meeting attendance requirement . . . [in the
Steelworkers constitution] is a reasonable qualification, and whether or not it has
been uniformly imposed, as required by section 401 (e) of the Act.
Ibid.
210. See note 202 supra. Compare the observation of the federal court in November,
1958: "Time is of the essence in this matter. Plaintiffs were elected for a two-year term."
Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544, 550 (S.D. Calif. 1958).
211. 105 CONG. REc. 1728-29 (1959) (comments by then Secretary of Labor Mitchell);
2 LEG. HIST. LMRDA 992.
212. See, e.g., BLMR, T-0631 (Hotel, Restaurant Employees, Los Angeles Joint Ex-
ecutive Board) : trusteeship imposed on September 26, 1960; complaint filed with Secretary
on June 6, 1961. Attorney for complainant "quite upset about the long period of time with-
out any decision on the part of the Secretary." Letter from Edward Mosk to author, Jan.
31, 1962, on file in Yale Law Library; see also BLMR, T-0664 (International Mailers
Union, Local 14, Philadelphia, Pa.) : trusteeship imposed January 16, 1961, complaint filed
with Secretary on February 13, 1961. "Speaking frankly, even the highly overrated Depart-
ment of Labor... found some way to 'pass the buck' and to ignore what was happening."
Letter from L. M. Sagot to author, Jan. 11, 1962, on file in Yale Law Library.
212a. Section 401(b), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (Supp. II, 1961).
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political, those trusteeships on which the Bureau receives a complaint are likely
to be highly political.213 The Bureau should recognize these factors and act
with the speed that is thereby required if there is to be any meaningful dis-
position. The Bureau has not done this; rather there seems to be a tendency
to conduct endless investigations and reviews in the hope that the problems
will become "moot" before a determination necessitates court action. The
effect in the local political milieu is disaster for the elected local officers.214
A complainant may choose to seek relief elsewhere than through the Secre-
tary, but he must be able to pay legal fees, be willing to forego the advantage of
the Bureau's extensive investigative resources, and willing to yield any possible
advantages of the anonymity insured by the act.2 15 The act preserves state
remedies in trusteeship cases,216 and any possible jurisdictional roadblocks to
an individual's action against the international in federal courts are also re-
moved.2 1 7 The wording of sections 304(a), 304(b), and 306, especially when
213. The statement that political disputes are the kind most likely to engender formal
complaints is borne out by the history of court actions. See Summers, The Law of Union
Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 192-96, 221 (1960).
214. A loss in a union political dispute can mean the loss of more than an elective
position; it may mean the loss of employment itself. The men may attempt to stay in their
trade, see, e.g., the experiences of Ciepley and Rappaport, discussed in note 226 infra; see
especially Letters, The Reporter, May 14, 1959, pp. 8-9. Or they leave the labor movement,
see, e.g., Leonard M. Sagot, see letter from Sagot to author, Jan. 11, 1962. In either case
their political effectiveness is probably over unless they choose to fight from the wings-
like John L. Cooper, former Chairman, Los Angeles Joint Board, Hotel, Restaurant Em-
ployees. See note 183 supra.
215. That his identity remain a secret is probably not important to the complainants
who have a political stake in the union. Although the Secretary is prohibited from disclos-
ing his identity, his name is probably not a secret to the international. On the other hand,
the Bureau's investigation powers and resources may be of considerable aid to an individual
complainant--"knowing" something is wrong may be a long way from proving it in court.
Further, most union members, even if they are local union officers, do not have the neces-
sary financial resources to carry on protracted litigation and must depend upon the Secre-
tary; but a large faction in an international union normally will have sufficient finances to
carry out at least the key battles.
216. Kuka v. Hoffman, 45"L.R.R.M. 2284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); BLMR, T-0536
(Upholsters, Local 601, New York City, N.Y.). Section 603(a) of LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 3(a) (Supp. II 1961), provides:
Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall reduce or
limit the responsibilities of any labor organization... under any other Federal law
or under the laws of any State, and, except as explicitly provided to the contrary,
nothing in this Act shall take away any right or bar any remedy to which members
of a labor organization are entitled under such other Federal law or law of any
State.
Section 306, of Title III is similar.
217. See, e.g., the Kaiser local litigation listed in note 198 supra. Immediately after
the trusteeship was imposed over Steelworkers' Local 2869 (Kaiser Steel), but before pas-
sage of the LMRDA, the local officers commenced a federal action alleging that the trus-
teeship had been imposed in violation of the international constitution. Flaherty v. Mc-
Donald, 178 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Calif. 1959). The court agreed with the plaintiffs: "In this
particular case International disregarded its contractual obligation relative to charges and
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read in conjunction with the legislative history,218 plainly show that two
federal remedies exist for redress of Title III violations: the complainant may
either file with the Secretary or commence his own action in a federal court21 9
However, in the early Flaherty litigation over the Kaiser Steel trusteeship, a
federal district court misread the statute, holding that the Secretary must find
a violation of the title before the court can have jurisdiction over the trustee-
ship.220 At least one other court followed this view,221 but another district court's
trials of Local officers." Id. at 550. But it could not find that jurisdiction had been obtained
over the defendant-international. The International President, the International Secretary-
Treasurer, and the trustee appointed by the International Executive Board had been served,
but the court held that the proper defendant was the Executive Board itself, of whom the
international officers were mere servants. The trustee, while a representative of the Ex-
ecutive Board, could not be said to adequately represent an organization of 1,200,000 mem-
bers, id. at 551. Further, the court held that plaintiffs had failed to establish the requisite
jurisdictional amount for a diversity action. Id. at 552. Plaintiffs here might have had more
success had they based their suit on § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley), but they did not then have the benefit of the decisions in the Local 28 case. See
discussion in note 147 supra. See also the Philadelphia-Delaware Operating Engineers
cases in note 113 supra. See Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1182 (1959).
218. Compare S. REP. No. 187 on S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959) ("suits
under the Federal statute will be confined to actions brought by the Secretary of Labor"),
with H.R. REP. No. 741 on H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1959) ("Also any member
or subordinate body of a labor organization affected may bring a civil action in a district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization to prevent and
restrain any violation of this title (except sec. 301) and for such other relief as may be
appropriate"). When S. 1555 was sent to the House, § 306 began with the clear statement
that "nothing contained in this title shall be deemed to authorize any suit in any court of
the United States except upon complaint of the Secretary." The Senate bill then went to
the House where this sentence was struck from § 306, and the final sentence of § 304(a)
was added. The House then passed H.R. 8342, clearly explaining that these changes would
grant the individual the alternative remedy of commencing an action directly in a federal
court, H.R. REP. No. 741 on H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1959). The Joint Con-
ference Committee adopted the House version of §§ 304(a) and 306 and that wording ap-
pears in the final bill. Indeed, Senator Morse cited these changes in the Senate bill, which
he felt would encourage "forum shopping," as one of his reasons for voting against the
final act. 105 CONG. R c. 16386 (Daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
219. The wording of the section would not compel the conclusion that complainant
must choose either a remedy via the Secretary or an independent court action. Although
one court has suggested he might have to make such choice, Palisades Lodge 173 v. Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks, 47 L.R.R.M. 2605 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the issue is not closed. In any
case, if one member filed a complaint with the Secretary, that would not bar another
member or the subordinate body itself from filing a direct court action. Section 306 pro-
vides that if the Secretary files a court action, the jurisdiction, of that district would be
exclusive.
220. Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Calif. 1960). Plaintiffs had re-
turned after their failure to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant-international before
LMRDA was enacted, see note 217 supra. Plaintiffs now alleged that the trusteeship had
been imposed and was being administered in violation of the international constitution and
therefore in violation of § 302, and further that it had been imposed and was being con-
tinued for an. improper purpose under § 302. Jurisdiction over the defendant-international
was predicated on § 304(b), but the court now held that it no longer had jurisdiction over
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opinion in Local 28 v. IBEW 222 should eliminate any doubt of the individual's
right to enforce Title III.23
INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS OF TITLE III
The Mechanics of Sections 302 and 304(c)
Title III leaves the final determination of validity of a trusteeship to the
courts. Section 302 furnished two tests for validity: the trusteeship must be
established and administered in accordance with the union's constitution and
bylaws, and for a purpose recognized as proper under section 302. "Proper
purpose," however, is broadly defined to include the use of a trusteeship in
the subject matter because, as the court read § 304(a), "a violation must have been deter-
mined to exist before suit may be brought and the only procedure for determination of
such violation is ... by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. .. ." 183 F. Supp.
at 305. The action was also based on § 102 of Title I, alleging a violation of § 101 (a) (1),
but the court held that Title I did not confer any rights upon officers of a union to chal-
lenge removal from office.
221. Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960), BLMR, T-0006 (Retail
Clerks, Local 1262, Newark, N.J.); Tomko v. Hilbert, 46 L.R.R.M. 2853 (W.D. Pa.
1960) (semble).
222. Executive Bd., Local 28, IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 184 F.
Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960). The local's officers alleged violations of §§ 302 and 303(a) (2)
in their Title III complaint; the international moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis
of Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Calif. 1960), and Rizzo v. Ammond, 182
F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960). The court, in denying the motion, went to great, and exacting,
length to show the faulty logic of these two decisions:
(i) Language of the Act. To the court, the language is clear. Had it been intended
to make the Secretary of Labor the sole enforcing medium, the most elementary
draftsmanship could have made this crystal clear and unmistakable....
(ii) Justification of Alternative Remedies. There is a very pragmatic justification
for the provision for suits by the Secretary of Labor in trusteeship cases, or in the
absence of such suit, by the members of the labor organization.... A cautious, timid,
or financially poor member of a labor organization may therefore rely completely,
and anonymously, upon, the Secretary of Labor. A more brash, imprudent, or finan-
cially better-off member need not first invoke the aid of the Secretary of Labor.
(iii) Legislative History. A review of the legislative history of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act unmistakably shows that two coordinate, alter-
native remedies exist for redress of violations under a trusteeship....
(iv) Interpretive Bulletins of the Secretary of Labor. In at least four bulletins is-
sued in September 1959 by the Secretary of Labor construing the Act, or various
aspects thereof, the Secretary has explicitly recognized the right of a member or
subordinate labor organization to sue in trusteeship cases if the Secretary had not
sued.
184 F. Supp. at 656-58.
223. The district court for the Southern District of California, however, refused to
reconsider its previous opinion in light of the Maryland district court opinion. Flaherty v.
International Union, United Steelworkers, 46 L.R.R.M. 3006 (S.D. Calif. 1960). One other
district court has supported the Flaherty-Rizzo logic in dictum, but since the Local 28
opinion was not mentioned, it may not have been called to the attention of that court. Cox
v. Hutcheson, 49 L.R.R.M. 2990 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
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"otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization."
The wisdom of this open check provision is dubious, but enumeration of every
legitimate purpose for a trusteeship defies current knowledge. In fact, section
302 may be read as a confession that substantive rules governing the validity of
trusteeships were not possible. Congress' solution was to substitute a pro-
cedural rule in section 304(c) for a substantive one, and, beyond that, to leave
it to the courts for solution.
In an enforcement proceeding, under the rules of section 304(c), a trustee-
ship's purpose may be presumed valid, may be presumed invalid, or may be
tested without any presumption of validity. Because the definition of standards
is so difficult, the presumption based upon the duration of the trusteeship is
critical. The purpose of a trusteeship will ordinarily be presumed valid during
its first eighteen months; thereafter it shall be presumed invalid.
A trusteeship over eighteen months may be continued only if the interna-
tional presents "clear and convincing proof" that it is necessary for a purpose
allowable under section 302. If this degree of proof is met, the court can
still retain jurisdiction over the trusteeship.224 When a trusteeship has been
in force for less than eighteen months, the effect of section 304(c) is less clear.
If a new trusteeship meets certain tests, it attains the status of being presumed
valid in the absence of clear and convincing proof that it was not established
or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under section 302.2
5
Eighteen months is a long time in the political arena of the local. If the
international wishes to rid itself of intransigent local leaders, eighteen months
of martial law is likely to create situations where such leaders may be charged,
tried, and expelled, unless they are willing to forego all political activity dur-
ing this period.226 Fear that the eighteen-month shifting presumption of sec-
224. At this juncture, the court might set an absolute time-limit to continuance, or
order local elections pursuant to termination of international supervision, or limit the
trusteeship to specific aspects of the local's life such as a continuance over the financial
affairs of the local, but return all other affairs of the local to control of its members.
225. Under § 304(a), the Secretary is commanded to investigate complaints to deter-
mine if there is probable cause to believe there has been a violation. Investigating a trus-
teeship whose duration is less than eighteen months, it is not hard to imagine a set of facts
where the Secretary might find "probable cause" to believe there has been a violation, but
still not feel that he has "clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established
or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under section 302," as required by
§ 304(c). This obviously presents a problem to the Secretary: Should "clear and convinc-
ing" be read adjectivally with "probable cause"? The answer would seem to be in the
affirmative, but this would then require little cause indeed if the trusteeship were over
eighteen months. Given the length of time necessary for a proper investigation by the
Secretary, and the present crowded state of court dockets, some of the dilemma disappears:
The degree of proof is a trial question and an action commenced some months before the
expiration of eighteen months is not likely to come to trial before the presumption makes
its radical shift.
226. Often the same reason for imposing the trusteeship will also mean that charges
are pressed against individual officers. A determination by a court that the trusteeship is
invalid, or even a determination by the Secretary that there is probable cause to believe
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tion 304(c) would be a carte blanche for manipulation by the international
at the expense of local autonomy led some Congressmen to propose an absolute
limit to the duration of trusteeships 22 7 and brought forth a floor fight on the
Dodd amendment, which would have provided presumptive invalidity for all
trusteeships.
22s
the act has been violated, will strengthen the charged officers' defense and particularly
their appeal to the union convention. On the other hand, if the union succeeds in expelling
or effectively neutralizing the rebel officers before any determination is made on the trus-
teeship's validity, or if that determination is that the trusteeship is valid, then the reason
for continuing the trusteeship may vanish and it can be terminated. See, e.g., Philadelphia
Mailers Union No. 14, notes 188-89 supra.
When the trusteeship is imposed without charges being filed against the local's officers,
the martial law aspect can almost force them to violate rules of the trustee: In the Amal-
gamated Tool & Die Lodge 113 of the International Association of Machinists in Chicago,
local rebels Ciepley and Rappaport, exposing financial irregularities on the part of the in-
cumbents, won a close election. Machinist President Hayes placed the local into trustee-
ship. The trustee suspended general lodge meetings and banned discussion at shop meetings
of any general lodge business. Ciepley and Rappaport did not prevent others from obtain-
ing signatures on a petition requesting President Hayes to lift the trusteeship at their local
shop meetings. The two rebels, serving as delegates from Lodge 113 to the Illinois AFL-
CIO convention, introduced a resolution requesting all unions to establish public review
boards and to limit trusteeships to six months. Ciepley and Rappaport were charged with
violating the trustee's rule and with taking intra-union business to foreign bodies; they
were convicted and expelled. The trusteeship was then. lifted. See Repas, "A Tale of Two
Expulsions" (pamphlet published by Ciepley-Rappaport Legal Fund, 1961) ; Jacobs, Mr.
Hayes Settles a Local Disturbance, The Reporter, April 2, 1959, p. 18; Letters, id., May
14, 1959, pp. 8-9; Benson, Labor's Uncertain Trumpet, The Progressive, June, 1959, p. 41;
New America, Dec. 15, 1960, p. 7; id., Jan. 24, 1961, p. 7; N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1960, § 4
(News of the Week in Review), p. 7, col. 1.
227. The McClellan Bill, S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1959), proposed a one-
year limit; the Dodd amendment, although more complicated, would have made two years
the outside limit for any trusteeship. The Senate rejected an absolute limit (the issue
apparently never arose in the House) because
if Communists capture a local union, it may be more than a year before interna-
tional officers can build up a group of loyal trade unionists able and willing to govern
their own affairs despite skilled subversion. Unhappily the entire leadership of a
local may be corrupt and its ouster leaves a vacuum which is not easily filled.
Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, in LABOR IN A FREE SocIE'ry 45,
85 (Harrington & Jacobs eds. 1959) ; compare S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1959). But this rationale leaves much to be desired, for there must be few cases in which
honest, capable candidates are totally unavailable. As for the emphasis on Communists,
aside from the fact that § 504(a) of the act bars them from holding office, charges of
Communism are an abused tactic in union politics. See, e.g., Lodge 113 IAM, note 226
supra; Horowitz, Possible Effects of LMRDA's Trusteeship Provisions, in SymposIum
oN LMRDA 458, 462.
228. Senator Dodd presented a rather sweeping amendment, which was debated and
finally defeated on the Senate floor by a vote of 51 to 41. 105 CONG. REc. 6675-81 (1959) ;
2 LEG. HIsT. LMRDA 1202-08. In effect the amendment would have cut the eighteen
months down to thirty days, thus recognizing the emergency nature of many trusteeships,
but insuring that the international would have to justify its imposition and continuance
soon. International unions would have to obtain a temporary order from the Secretary,
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The status of presumed validity, however, does not attach to a trusteeship
unless it hurdles the two prior tests of section 304(c) : A trusteeship must be
established in accordance with the procedural requirements of the union con-
stitution, and its imposition must be authorized or ratified after a fair hearing.
After meeting both tests, section 304(c) grants a presumption of validity to
the purpose of the trusteeship, which can be rebutted only by clear and con-
vincing proof of improper purpose. The first test, confined to the establish-
ment of a trusteeship in conformity with the union's constitution, is mis-
leading. For section 302, which governs the substantive validity of a trus-
teeship, also requires that it be administered in accordance with the union's
constitution. Because this language is omitted from section 304(c), the
question arises as to the quantum of proof necessary for a court to find
that the trusteeship is invalid because not administered in accordance with the
constitution. Since the shelter of presumed validity attaches only to the pur-
pose of a trusteeship, and since a union should not be allowed to obtain the
advantages of a presumption while not adhering to the requirements of its own
constitution, a trusteeship should be held invalid upon a showing of less than
clear and convincing proof that its administration is in violation of the union's
constitution. Any other construction would leave Title III with less control
over the administration of trusteeships than a state court would have.22 9 This
construction, moreover, would give proper effect to administrative procedural
safeguards which are sometimes provided in union constitutions.230 For in-
stance, the constitution of the United Packinghouse Workers affirmatively
provides that a trusteed local has the right to elect delegates to union con-
ventions 2 31 and the constitution of the International Longshoremen's and
on the basis of an ex parte hearing, to impose a trusteeship; the Secretary would then
cause a hearing to be held within 30 days at which the international would be required to
present clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was established properly for an
allowable reason under § 302; the Secretary could then validate the trusteeship for up to
one year and could later renew the approval for an additional year. During the debate on
the Dodd amendment, Senator Morse offered a "friendly amendment" which was rejected
by Senator Dodd, but accepted by the bill's sponsors and incorporated into the final Senate
bill, S. 1555: the eighteen months in § 304(c) was cut to twelve, and during the first twelve
months a trusteeship would not enjoy any special presumtion of validity. 105 CONG. REc.
months a trusteeship would not enjoy any special presumption of validity. 105 CoNG. REc.
Conference Committee. Oddly enough, Senator Morse, in final debate, opposed any shorten-
ing of the period of presumed validity. 105 CONG. REc. 14988, 14989-90 (1959) ; 2 LEa. HIsT.
LMRDA 1325, 1327.
229. State courts have traditionally enforced the terms of union constitutions. See note
148 supra.
230. Congress surely did not mean to hinder such adherence to democratic ways, but
the practical effect of Title III may be that international unions whose constitutions were
more stringent than the act will now amend their trusteeship provisions to conform with
the looser provisions set out by Congress as the minimum necessary. Such a process has
taken place. See Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1961) (Machinists). Compare
Teamsters, CoNsTrrUTioN, art. VI, § 5 (1957), with id. (1961).
231. BLS No. 1263, at 16 (1959).
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Warehousemen's Union provides for automatic termination of a trusteeship at
the end of one year.
232
The second test that must be met before a trusteeship is presumed valid
under section 304(c) is the fair hearing requirement before either the execu-
tive board or such other body as may be provided in the union constitution or
bylaws requirement. But section 302 does not require a union to conduct a
fair hearing in imposing a trusteeship, unless the international constitution so
requires. 233 Therefore, the test is puzzling; nevertheless, it could have wide
ramifications on trusteeship practices. The anomaly arises that if the con-
stitution requires a fair hearing, an international may not establish any
valid trusteeship without such a hearing; but if the constitution does not, then
an international may establish a valid trusteeship-albeit without the presump-
tion-without any hearing whatsoever.2 4 Thus, though section 304(c) at
first appears to draw a sharp either-or-division on presumed validity of pur-
pose at the eighteen-month line, there is in fact a third status: A trusteeship
of less than eighteen months duration, established without a hearing in con-
formity with a union's constitution that does not require a hearing, has no
presumption of validity or invalidity when challenged.
The fair hearing test of section 304(c) may be an opening wedge to a
long-overdue reform in the American labor movement: impartial trial or hear-
ing bodies.23 5 Trusteeships are generally imposed either by the international
232. Id. at 17.
233. BLS No. 1263, at 9-11, reports that of the 67 constitutions studied, 29 had no
hearing provision for trusteeships, while 16 of the remaining 38 constitutions had hearing
provisions that would not apply to all situations under which a trusteeship could be im-
posed. Furthermore, the hearing normally seems to be conducted by the international ex-
ecutive board, or by a committee thereof.
234. Congressional history is silent as to the fair hearing test, but it is certainly ques-
tionable, in view of the general purposes of the title, that an international requiring a trus-
teeship hearing should be penalized for its caution. It is not impossible that some courts
would read a fair hearing requirement into § 302 as a mandatory requirement. See Sloan
v. Braun, 20 Misc. 2d 204, 191 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1959) ; Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d
283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958); Bricklayers' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y.
Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
235. Public Review Boards, composed of prominent citizens who hear appeals involv-
ing internal union disputes, have been established by the Automobile Workers, see Oberer,
Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 55 (1959),
and the Upholsterers, see Note, Public Review Boards: A Check on Union Discipline, 11
STAx. L. Rtv. 497 (1959). Such boards hear trusteeship cases. See notes 60-61 supra.
Public Review Boards, though presenting their own problems, represent an attempt to
avoid the prosecutor-judge singleness in union trial provisions. See Union. Democracy in
Action, No. 1, undated [1961]; cf. LEisERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEmOcR cy 111,
212, 260-67 (1959). For this reason they are often demanded by union opposition groups.
See, e.g., Machinists, Repas, "A Tale of Two Expulsions" (pamphlet published by Ciepley-
Rappaport Legal Fund, 1961) ; Jacobs, Mr. Hayes Settles a Local Disturbance, The Re-
porter, April 2, 1959, p. 18; Painters, Union Democracy in Action, No. 3, p. 3 (Sept. 1961) ;
United Papermakers and Paperworkers, Union Democracy in Action, No. 4, pp. 7-8 (Jan.
1962).
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executive board or by the most influential member of that board, the inter-
national president.2 36 Often the same individual performs the various roles
of prosecutor and judge. In many cases, especially political ones, the in-
ternational executive board may be unable to conduct a "fair" hearing be-
cause of bias.2 7 The tendency for union political cases to breed procedural
defects as well as bias has not escaped attention by commentators 2 38 or
the courts; in New York, where the courts have repeatedly dealt with these
problems, many due process requirements have been imposed on union dis-
ciplinary procedures. 23 9 Section 304(c) will require the federal courts to
determine if a fair hearing has been granted and thus to define the requisites
of such a hearing. The structure of section 304(c) means that unions desiring
to use the trusteeship tool effectively may be forced to set up hearing procedures
before bodies other than the executive board, perhaps before Public Re-
view Boards such as those used in the Auto Workers and Upholsterers.240
A trusteeship complying with these two tests is relatively insulated from
attack for eighteen months. To challenge such a trusteeship, a complainant needs
clear and convincing proof that it was not established or maintained in
good faith for a purpose allowable under section 302. However, the require-
ment that the trusteeship be "maintained in good faith," though apparently
vague, does provide a meaningful criterion to appraise the validity of a trustee-
236. BLS No. 1263, at 5-6.
237. This is all the more true where local officers have publicly criticized and opposed
the international leadership. Even where valid reasons existed for imposing the trusteeship,
fair trials may be difficult to imagine. See, e.g., BLMR, T-0402 (Steelworkers, Local 2869,
Fontana, Calif.) (Local President Flaherty was a prominent member of the Dues Protest
Committee, a national organization in opposition to the international leadership which,
under the Steelworkers' CoNsTIruTroN, art. IX, § 1 (1960), was the hearing body);
BLMR, T-0664 (Mailers, Local 14, Philadelphia, Pa.) (Local President Sagot supported
an opposition candidate against the international president in 1958, was himself defeated
as incumbent international secretary-treasurer in 1960 by a candidate friendly to the major-
ity on the international executive board, but was re-elected president of his home local
against a candidate friendly to the international leadership in. 1960; the trusteeship was
imposed in January 1961.
238. See, e.g., Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact,
70 YALE L.J. 175, 193-94, 200 (1960) ; Note, Union Democracy-A Case Study, 10 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 311 (1959).
239. The New York courts seem to have gone the furthest in protecting due process
at union hearings. See Di Bucci v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct
1959) (member ruled off ballot by trustee of local) ; Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d
521, 184 N.Y.S..d 226 (1959) (suspension of member's right to attend meetings or rum for
office at a time when local was in trusteeship). The development of the case law in New
York is described in Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In
Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
240. For a discussion of the Public Review Boards, their advantages, limitations, and
problems, see Blaine, "Voluntary, Impartial Review in Trade Unions: A Critical Appraisal
of the UAW Public Review Board" (unpublished divisional paper, June 1962, on file in
Yale Law Library). See also Brooks, Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes:
Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 64 (1961) ; Oberer, Voluntary
Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 55 (1959).
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ship and therefore lessens the effect of the presumption, Section 302 enumer-
ates proper reasons for which a trusteeship may be imposed; it does not pre-
scribe the degree of local autonomy which may be suspended for those reasons.
Furthermore, section 3(h) envisions varying degrees of suspension of
autonomy. Here the "good faith" requirement of section 304(c) may be used.
Good faith should require that the degree of autonomy suspended fit the evil
to be cured.241 For example, financial malpractice is a proper purpose, allowing
a trusteeship to be imposed to straighten out the local's financial affairs. But if
the malpractice consisted of embezzlement by the treasurer, or was discovered
by a new local administration, it would not necessarily justify suspension of all
officers, meetings, committees, and caucuses. The good faith of such a trustee-
ship might be challenged with a request for appropriate relief under section
304(a) ; the trustee could be enjoined from interfering with aspects of local
business unconnected with financial affairs.242 Measuring the actual administra-
tion of a trusteeship against its alleged purpose as a test of good faith would
afford some boundaries to the otherwise vague criteria of section 302. The
good faith requirement could thus be used to prevent an international, faced
with a recalcitrant local, from seizing upon one particular instance of malpractice
or neglect on the part of the local as an excuse to suspend all local autonomy.
Section 303
The McClellan Committee uncovered two particularly obnoxious trusteeship
abuses: The use of a trusteeship to deplete the local treasury, and the con-
trol of union conventions through the use of appointed delegates from trusteed
locals.24 3 Congress responded with section 303. Although embodying laudable
objectives, the drafting of this section leaves much to be desired. 2 "
241. The Local 28 court took much the same approach toward § 101(a) (5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1961):
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or other-
wise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or any officer
thereof unless such member has been
(A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense;
(C) afforded a full and fair hearing,
using that section as a basis for finding that expulsion was too extreme a penalty. See Parks
v. IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288, 305-12 (1962). In support, the court cited Cox's summary of
state court reactions to expulsions in Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Demnoc-
racy, 72 HARV. L. Rav. 609, 615 (1959). Id. at 305 n.31.
242. Section 304 (a) actions may be "for such relief (including injunctions) as may be
appropriate"; this phrase certainly implies that a court may "retain jurisdiction of the
cause on such conditions and for such period as it deems appropriate" whether or not the
trusteeship has been in existence for eighteen months. The final sentence of § 304(c),
specifically empowering a court to retain jurisdiction of trusteeships after the expiration
of eighteen months, while clarifying, does not limit continuing jurisdiction to those instances
where trusteeships have been in existence for over eighteen months.
243. See notes 77-78 supra.
244. Section 303 was never debated in Congress, and the original wording of the
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Section 303 (a) (1) provides that:
During any period when a subordinate body of a labor organization is
in trusteeship, it shall be unlawful (1) to count the vote of delegates from
such body in any convention or election of officers of the labor organiza-
tion unless the delegates have been chosen by secret ballot in an election
in which all the members in good standing of such subordinate body were
eligible to participate.
Section 303(a) (1) does not require that a trusteed local be represented in
any manner at conventions.24 5 It commands that in order for the delegates
from a trusteed local to vote at conventions they must have been elected by
secret ballot at the local. The result of section 303 (a) (1) is that the inter-
national administration may cut down its opponent's vote by imposing trustee-
ships over rebel locals with impunity, but may not add the votes of the local
to the administration's column by appointing loyal delegates. The result of
either method is, however, identical. The ease with which section 303 (a) (1)
can be avoided indicates how the section should have been drafted, but if
trusteeships are manipulated to control convention decisions so that section
303 does not apply, an appropriate civil remedy may still be found in section
304(a), which empowers the court to fashion appropriate civil remedies. For
example, an international could be enjoined from acting on convention de-
cisions that may have been affected by the invalid trusteeship and by absent
delegates.2 46
Section 303 (a) (1) bars counting votes of appointed delegates "in any con-
vention or election of officers"; a rapid perusal of the section can lead to the con-
clusion that it covers only elections of officers. 247 But the section, especially when
read in the light of section 301 (a)'s reporting requirements, 248 encompasses all
Kennedy-Ervin Bill, S. 505, remained with only some minor wording differences between
the Senate version and the House version. The Senate version, included the words "charter
or" before "constitution and by-laws" in the proviso, and the wording of subsection (b)
varied slightly.
245. Only the constitution of the Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers guarantees
a trusteed local's right to elect delegates to union conventions. BLS No. 1263, at 16 (study
of 67 constitutions in 1959). If such a clause exists, it may be enforceable by challenging
the validity of the trusteeship under §-302's command that the trusteeship be "administered
... only in accordance with the constitution-." See discussion in text at notes 229-32 supra.
246. The courts might find some guides in § 402 of Title IV (Elections) which pro-
vides, in part, that where a court finds upon a preponderance of the evidence that a violation
may have affected the outcome of an election, it shall declare the election to be void and
direct the conduct of a new election.
247. If § 303 (a) (1) were limited to conventions at which officers were elected, some
unions would never have to cast a glance at the subsection, since they elect their officers by
national referendum. See, e.g., United Mine Workers, CONSTITUTIo N, art. XI (1960) ; In-
ternational Association of Machinists, CONSTITUTION, art. III (1961). See also BUREAU
or LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 1239, ELECTION AND TENURE
oF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL UNION OFFICERS 10-16 (1958).
248. (a) Every labor organization which has or assumes trusteeship . . . shall file
... the following information: . . . (4) the nature and extent of participation by
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votes at any conventions, regardless of whether officers are elected. In the Phila-
delphia Mailers Union case, Local 14 and already elected its three delegates to
the 1961 International Convention when the trustee took office. Two of these
elected delegates were then tried and suspended and the trustee appointed two
others, friendly to him, to represent the local. In the semi-annual report to
the Bureau, filed before the Convention, the international noted the appoint-
ment of the delegates, apparently assuming section 303 (a) (1) did not apply
since no election of international officers was scheduled.249 Meanwhile, the
suspended local president filed a complaint with the Bureau that this would
violate section 303(a) (1). 215 The international apparently reread the section
more closely and came to the correct conclusion that the appointed delegates
should not vote at all.251
Effective use of section 303 is further complicated by the fact that section
303 (b) provides for criminal sanctions for willful violations of section 303 (a) :
"Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both." The unlawful
act is not to appoint the delegates, nor even to vote, but "to count the vote."
The force of the section thus seems to fall on the Convention Teller-often
an honor bestowed upon the oldest brother in the convention hall. To avoid
this absurd result, it should be held that the unlawful act was committed by
the labor organization itself, acting through its convention. The act includes
labor organizations under its definition of "person," 25 2 and if the labor organi-
zation cannot be imprisoned, it can at least be fined. If an international can be
found to be willfully acting, or if the international president himself willfully
counted the votes, or perhaps if the octogenarian teller did, section 303(b)
makes each act of counting such votes a crime for which a $10,000 fine, or
a year in jail, or both, may be imposed. The toll for the votes of two appointed
delegates at a three-day convention could be large enough to destroy the
organization. 25 The difficulty of finding a reasonable interpretation of the
the membership of the subordinate organization in the selection of delegates to rep-
resent such organization in regular or special conventions or other policy-determin-
ing bodies and in the election of officers of the labor organization which has assumed
trusteeship over such subordinate organization.
249. The Trustee of the Philadelphia Mailers Union No. 14 appointed Samuel Wax
and Louis Marrow as delegates to the convention. As such they will not vote for
election. of any officers at the convention.
T-0664 (Semi-Annual Report, July 10, 1961).
250. Letter from L. M. Sagot to Commissioner Holcombe, July 7, 1961, copy on file
in Yale Law Library.
251. BLMR, T-0664 (Mailers, Local 14, Philadelphia, Pa.) (Termination Report);
see also letter from L. M. Sagot to author, June 2, 1962, on file in Yale Law Library.
Complainant Sagot raises an interesting point, however, when he says the appointed dele-
gates "did take an active part in, the deliberations, discussions and committees of the con-
vention-including voting in the Committee itself." Ibid. Quaere: What constitutes voting
at a convention?
252. Section 3(d), 73 Stat. 520, 29 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1958).
253. Had the Mailers allowed the two appointed delegates to vote at their 1961 con-
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criminal sanctions of section 303 leaves the enforcement of the section pri-
marily to the civil remedy. In granting "appropriate relief" for voting viola-
tions under section 101(a) (1), the courts may derive guidance from other
parts of the act, especially Title IV (Elections).254 The appropriate civil
remedy could be to avoid any decision which was carried or defeated by the
votes of the appointed delegates. Under section 304(a), the Secretary would
first determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the appointed
delegates voted and then determine if the violation was remedied by the size of
the majority compared to the number of appointed delegates. Other questions,
where such votes were not decisive, should not be affected. But if a significant
number of important convention votes were affected, or if the number "of ap-
pointed delegates was proportionately large, the relief might be to set aside the
entire convention.
2 55
Section 303 (a) (2) states that:
During any period when a subordinate body of a labor organization is in
trusteeship, it shall be unlawful ... (2) to transfer to such organization
any current receipts or other funds of the subordinate body except the
normal per capita tax and assessments payable by subordinate bodies not
in trusteeship: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the
distribution of the assets of a labor organization in accordance with its
constitution and bylaws upon the bona fide dissolution thereof.
The "anti-milking" provision-a term used, but not defined, by Congress 25 7 -
is subject to varying interpretations. If emphasis is placed on the phrase
"transfer to," section 303 (a) (2) may be interpreted merely to prohibit ex-
penditures by the international from the local treasury which would not other-
wise be made. Under this interpretation, for example, the total wage bill of the
trusteed local could not be increased; if the international wanted to pay their
trustee a higher wage, the "extra" would have to come from international funds.
But excluding "extras," does it follow that the local must pay any salary to the
international's trustee? If the local officers attack the trusteeship, may the
international defend with local funds ?258 The wording of section 303 (a) (2),
vention, one day alone, August 23, with at least 38 convention votes, could have amounted
to a maximum fine of $760,000. International Mailer, Oct. 1961, No. 10, 95-151.
254. See note 246 supra.
255. The international character of many unions further complicates any attempt to
apply the LMRDA. Suppose the appointed delegates come from trusteed Canadian locals?
What of the votes counted in Montreal, Canada, where the Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill
Workers held their 1959 convention? What if the appointed delegates came from Canadian
locals, voting in Canada, for a Canadian Regional Director, who would also serve as a
member of the International Executive Board which determines policy for the entire union?
See United Automobile Workers, CONSTIUTUON, art. 10, §§ 2 and 22(7) (1959). Cf. Man-
gum, One Union's Experience Under LMRDA Titles I-IV, in SYmpuosium oN LMRDA
1165, 1172-73.
257. S. RE!p. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1959); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1959).
258. Expenditures for legal services increased from $450 in 1959, Statement of Receipts
and Disbursements (Form LM-2), Jan. 1, 1959-Dec. 31, 1959, and $189.38 in 196 , id.,
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limiting payments to normal per capita tax and assessments unrelated to
trusteeships, strongly indicates that payments such as salaries and legal fees
are proscribed. The trustee is the agent of the international and it is not
unreasonable that it should pay his salary. The additional incentive for the
international to terminate trusteeships promptly would certainly be consistent
with the purpose of Title III.
The Secretary has not publicly adopted either interpretation of section
303 (a) (2). In the Philadelphia Mailers case,259 complainant also alleged a
violation of this section. The International Mailers Union did not pay the
salaries of its trustee or the two full-time assistant trustees appointed by him;
rather it authorized them to draw a total of $750 a week from the Local 14
treasury. Since this increased the wage bill of the local beyond what had been
paid to the suspended officers,260 section 303 (a) (2) would appear to have
been violated, regardless of the way it is interpreted. A determination by the
Secretary in that case, however, is now "unlikely," for "the matter is con-
sidered moot." 26' But the position that mere termination of the trusteeship
Jan. 1, 1960-Dec. 31, 1960, to $4,066 in 1961, id., Jan. 1, 1961-Dec. 31, 1961. Sagot alleged
further that of the money spent for legal fees, approximately $1,000 went to the law firm
of one of the trustees. Letter from L. M. Sagot to author, June 2, 1962, copy on file in
Yale Law Library.
In this situation, the act again displays a variety of resources. In the election cases
under § 303(a) (1), guidance could be drawn from the elections title, specifically § 402(c).
See notes 254-55 supra and accompanying text. Here, the act may provide guidance in the
form of Title V (Safeguards for Labor Organizations) 73 Stat. 535-39 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 186, 501-04 (Supp. 111961), specifically § 501, 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
(Supp. II 1961), entitled Fiduciary Responsibility of Officers of Labor Organizations,
which reads, in part:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organiza-
tion occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a
group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account the special
problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property solely
for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and ex-
pend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of
the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organi-
zation as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected
with his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest
which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to account to the organi-
zation for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with trans-
actions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization.
This broad language, applied to the trustee's relationship with the trusteed local, would
prohibit the use of trusteed local funds to pay for the legal defense of the trusteeship. It
would probably extend as well to cases like the Pontiac Teamsters local, see text at note
95 supra, where the salaries of trustees convicted of extortion were continued during their
prison terms.
259. See notes 185-92 .mpra.
260. Compare Statement of Receipts and Disbursements (Form LM-2), Jan. 1, 1959-
Dec. 31, 1959 ($24,183A0) and Jan. 1, 1960-Dec. 31, 1960 ($24,467.57), with id., Jan. 1,
1961-Dec. 31, 1961 ($33,395), copies on file in Yale Law Library.
261. Letter from Commissioner Holcombe to L. M. Sagot, Feb. 2, 1962, in text at note
192 supra.
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can moot a section 303 (a) (2) violation is plainly untenable ;262 although the
violation might be remedied by the international repaying the local either the
entire salary of the trustee or the "extra" amounts involved, the Bureau has
not notified complainant of this "voluntary compliance." Unless the Secretary
has substituted mzay for shall in section 304(a), the only explanation for his
lack of prosecution is an interpretation of section 303(a) (2) permitting the
Bureau to determine the reasonableness of the trustee's salary.263 But this inter-
pretation seems to run counter to the plain wording of the statute. Moreover, if
compliance with the section depends on the reasonableness of the trustee's
salary, this should be a judicial interpretation rather than an administrative
one.2 64
ADmINISTRATION OF THE TRUSTEESHIP UNDER TITLES I AND IV.
The imposition and administration of a trusteeship, governed primarily by
Title III, may also be regulated by the Title I "Bill of Rights."2 65 Political
trusteeships which are imposed to supress opposition in the local union are
likely to violate the rights of the individual union members protected by Title
262. See text at notes 193-94 supra.
263. In PMU No. 14 the salaries paid to the trustee and his assistants, see note 260
stupra, would not seem to be unreasonable remuneration.
264. Section 303(a) (2) does allow the transfer of "normal per capita tax and assess-
ments" to the international, but even this relatively clear language is not free of problems.
Following the expulsion of the Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union from the
AFL-CIO, some locals attempted to leave the BCW and join the newly created American
Bakery and Confectionary Union, AFL-CIO. When the BCW learned that Portland Local
364 was about to switch, it imposed a trusteeship over the local, BLMR, T-0095 (Bakery
& Confectionery Workers, Local 364, Portland, Ore.) ; see Crocker v. Weil, 361 P.2d
1014 (Ore. 1961). This did not prevent the members' flight. The initial trusteeship report
for the local stated that the local had no members and was not engaged in collective bar-
gaining. BLMR, T-0095. The trustee had, however, managed to seize some $8,444.85 in
the local's treasury. Thereafter, the trustee of Local 364 regularly forwarded the "normal
per capita tax" to the international and faithfully reported this transfer to the Bureau in the
semi-annual trusteeship reports under § 301. These procedures in Local 364 were obvious
from the public reports filed by the union with the Secretary. Yet, assuming that this
situation ought to be treated as a trusteeship, see notes 147-49 supra, what could the Secre-
tary do about it, unless he received a complaint from a member or the subordinate body?
265. Title I makes no specific reference to Title III, although such references could
have been easily made (Title I was introduced into the act after Title III). Title I was
not included in the original Committee bill, S. 505, reported out to the Senate. During the
Committee hearings on the bill, Senator McClellan proposed a substitute bill, S. 1137,
which contained a comprehensive "Bill of Rights." Although rejected by the Committee,
McClellan's "Bill of Rights" proposal was subsequently accepted by the Senate in the
form of an amendment to S. 1555. 105 CONG. REc. 5827 (Daily ed. April 22, 1959). During the
debate it was superseded by the Kuchel substitute amendment, substantially the same, but
qualifying the rights granted. Id. at 6030 (Daily ed. April 25, 1959). In the House, the
Landrum-Griffin substitute bill which superseded the House Committee bill contained a
Bill of Rights provision similar to that passed by the Senate. The Conference Committee
accepted the House version of the Bill of Rights. See Aaron, The Union Member's "Bill of
Rights": The First Two Years, 1 IND. REL. 47, 48 (1962).
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I as well as the trusteeship provisions of Title III. To achieve the objectives
of the international, its emissary is likely to suspend officers, ban political
caucuses, prohibit distribution of literature, forbid unauthorized meetings of
members, suspend regular membership meetings, and enforce a myriad of
rules to carry out the purposes of the trusteeship. 26 6 These may run counter
to Title I's Bill of Rights.
A member can file a Title I action,2 67 alleging that the trustee's rules
violated his right under section 101(a) (1) or section 101(a) (2) "to meet
and assemble freely with other members."
n2 6 8
Section 101(a) (1) provides that:
Equal Rights.-Every member of a labor organization shall have equal
rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to
vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend mem-
266. See, e.g., Repas, "A Tale of Two Expulsions" (1961) (rules of the trustee over
Local 113, International Ass'n of Machinists) ; TArT, TH1E STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT
OF LABOR UNIONS 132 (1954) (trusteeship over a local of the Stage Employees Union).
267. Title I is enforceable by individuals, and not through complaints to the Secretary.
Section 102, the enforcement section, provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed
by any violation of this title may bring a civil action ... for such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate.
Title I is not a Bill of Rights for union officers, although the fact that a union member
is an officer will not negate his rights as a member under Title I: fine lines must be drawvn.
Congress did not intend to grant officers dismissed from office for misfeasance the protec-
tion of § 101(a) (5) procedures. See 105 CoNG. REc. 16415 (Daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959)
(remarks of Senator Kennedy). Thus, where a union officer is suspended from office for
misfeasance, see Bennett v. Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local 701, L.R.R.M. (D. Ore.
1960), or for failure to comply with statutory qualifications for union office, Jackson v.
Martin Co., 180 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1960) ; Strauss v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
179 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1959), or where no right of the officer as a member was involved,
Kelly v. Streho, L.R.R.M. (E.D. Mich. 1961), the courts have held that he is not protected
by § 101(a) (5). On the other hand, § 101(a) (5) will apply to an officer who is suspended
from office because of protected actions he took as a member. Sheridan v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners, Local 626, 191 F. Supp. 347 (D. Del. 1961); same, L.R.R.M. (D.
Del. 1961) [Sheridan, a union business agent, had preferred assault and battery charges
against another member, which violated the union rules, but was protected under §
101 (a) (4)]. The legislative history also made it clear that § 101 (a) (1) does not grant an
individual the right to run for or hold office, 105 CONG. REc. 6023-24 (Daily ed. April 25,
1959), and the decided cases agree. Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Calif.
1959) ; same, 183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Calif. 1960) ; Johnson v. San Diego Waiters & Bar-
tenders Union, Local 500, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Calif. 1961) ; Colpo v. Highway Truck
Drivers & Helpers Local 107, IBT, 49 L.R.R.M. 2295 (D. Del. 1961), appeal docketed, No.
13,850, 3rd Cir. But the mere fact that a member is an office holder does not wipe out his
rights as a member under § 101 (a) (1) or (2), as the recent battle in the Bakery and Con-
fectionery Workers illustrates. See cases cited in note 33 supra. See Aaron, supra note 265,
at 50-52.
268. In limited circumstances, a member might contend that the trustee's rule meant
that he had been "otherwise disciplined" under § 101 (a) (5) and had not been accorded that
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bership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon
the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regula-
tions in such organization's constitution and by laws.
Section 101 (a) (2) provides that:
Freedom of Speech and Assembly.-Every member of any labor organiza-
tion shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members;
and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meet-
ings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of
the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting,
subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining
to the conduct of meetings; Provided, That nothing herein shall be con-
strued to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that
would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
The rights of the member in this action depend upon the relationship be-
tween Title I and Title III; three different constructions are possible.
First, it might be argued that Title I rights are relative, that the issue is
whether all members of the local have the same rights. Thus, if the right to
meet freely with other members is denied to every member of the local, no
violation of Title I has occurred.2 69 This construction, if accepted, would
nullify any protection of section 101 (a) (1), since the only check on abridging
the right would be the requirement that they be totally abridged. Further-
more, although any denial of rights might possibly avoid section 101 (a) (1),
section 101 (a) (2) cannot be so avoided, for the rights defined therein are
clearly not relative.
2 70
Second, Titles I and III could be read in pari materia. The trusteeship it-
self would then be a reasonable rule under the proviso to section 101 (a) (2) ;
therefore, the shifting presumption rule of section 304(c) would be read into
the section 101 (a) (2) proviso. An action by a member under section 101 (a) (2)
to set aside the restrictive edicts of the trustee would parallel an action under
section 304(a) alleging that the trusteeship was not being maintained in good
section's safeguards against improper disciplinary action. See Parks v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers; Local 28 and IBEW v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 F. Supp.
288 (D. Md. 1962) ; Settle order, 49 L.R.R.M. 3157 (D. Md. March 30, 1962). See also
Aaron, supra note 265, at 63-71.
269. In Horn v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of
America, 194 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1961), it was held that where members were equal-
ly treated there could be no denial of a § 101(a) (1) right. In Ragland v. United Mine
Workers of America, 188 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ala. 1960), it was held that members of
District 50 had no right to vote and participate in national conventions of the Mine Workers
because Congress had not intended to confer a Title I right "where it had not previously
existed or should have existed." Id. at 133.
270. For a discussion of the disastrous effect that such decisions could have on Title
I, see Rosenberg, "Interpretive Problems of Title I of the LMRDA" 14-19 (unpublished
divisional paper April 1962, on file in Yale Law Library).
1962] 1513
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
faith2 71 While such an interpretation is possible, there is no compelling reason
to bring Title III's shifting presumption into Title I. Congress could have
easily so provided, but did not; in fact, the scheme of both titles militates
against reading them in pari materia. Section 306 preserves all other rights and
remedies in addition to those found in Title I.272 The purpose of Title III is
to govern the international-local relationship. The pervading purpose of Title
I is to guarantee specific rights to individual union members. The reasonable
rules which constitute the only limitations on Title I individual rights are of a
restricted nature ;273 to read the broad scope of Title III's presumption of a
trusteeship's validity into Title I as a "reasonable rule" would subvert the
aim of Title I.
Finally, the most promising solution would be to test the trustee's rules as
applied to freedom of individual members directly under Title I, without
special reference to the provisions of Title III. The existing circumstances in
the trusteed local could, of course, be taken into account in determining whether
the trustee's rule is a "reasonable" one under the proviso of section 101 (a) (2).
Although this would allow significant portions of some trusteeships to be
tested without reference to Title III's shifting presumptions, such an inter-
pretation would best serve the basic purposes of both titles in protecting the
rights of members and insuring local autonomy.
When the international decides to terminate a trusteeship it may be forced to
consider the election provisions of Title IV, as well as the Bill of Rights of
Title I. The international, normally not at all anxious to see the former local
leaders run for reelection, views the terminating election as an integral part of
the trusteeship: it wants firmly to guide the local in a new direction. Indeed,
elections may be held while the local is still under trusteeship and full
autonomy withheld until "said officers have demonstrated their ability to
271. See discussion at text accompanying notes 241-42 supra. A court could hold that
Title I is inoperative during a trusteeship and require plaintiff to refile his action under
Title III; the final determination would be the same, unless the action was filed in a
jurisdiction which maintains that the Secretary must first make a determination before the
court can grant any relief under Title III. Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.
Calif. 1960) ; Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456 (D. N.J. 1960). If these latter jurisdic-
tions allowed the action to proceed under Title I, they would be denying what little logic
there was in their earlier Title III opinions.
272. Some problems are presented by the proviso to § 306: "That upon the filing of a
complaint by the Secretary the jurisdiction of the district court over such trusteeship shall be
exclusive and the final judgment shall be res judicata." Where the Secretary has filed
a Title III action, a court hearing a Title I complaint involving the same trusteeship might
well stay proceedings pending the outcome of the Secretary's Title III action. Any argu-
ment against reading the titles in par materia would, of course, caution against using Title
III to limit the reach of Title I.
273. Section 101(a) (1) is subject only to "reasonable rules and regulations in such
organization's constitution and bylaws" and apparently not to ad hoc rules, such as would be
most rules promulgated by a trustee. Section 101(a) (2) is subject only to rules "as to the
responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining
from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal contractual obligations."
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handle the affairs of the Local Union,"274 or termination may be conditioned
upon particular officers being refused the right to run for reelection,2 75 or
other similar terms. 276 Title I, Title III, and Title IV are relevant in judging
the international's termination of a trusteeship with an election in which in-
dividual rights are affected.2
77
A hypothetical case may aid in focusing on the problems involved in such
terminations. The international placed a trusteeship over the local one month
after local elections had installed new officers for three-year terms. The interna-
tional imposed the trusteeship for two reasons: Some local funds were missing
(it was quickly learned they had been embezzled by the former treasurer who
now seemed safely beyond reach in Brazil), and the newly-elected local presi-
dent had announced that he would soon run against the incumbent interna-
tional president (this brought cheers from his fellow officers, but, it was al-
leged, caused factionalism and dissension within the local). At the end of
fifteen months, with an eye to a three-month lag on the court docket, the local
officers commenced a Title III action requesting that the trusteeship be
lifted and that they be restored to their offices to serve for their unexpired
terms. The trustee, apprehensive as to the outcome of the suit, announced that
the trusteeship would be terminated after new elections, but that in the best
interests of the local, the president could not be renominated.
At this juncture, Titles I and IV create a number of possible actions: to
prevent the election from being conducted, to force the inclusion of the presi-
dent's name on the ballot, or to set aside the election if held.
Section 101(a) (1) guarantees union members the right "to nominate
candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization ...
subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution
and bylaws." The right to vote "is not a mere naked right to cast a ballot, '2 78
274. See BLMR, T-0055 (Meat Cutters, Local 342, Jamaica, N.Y.).
275. See, e.g., the 1952 administratorship over Automobile Workers, Local 600, River
Rouge, Mich., as reported by Davis, Receivership in American Unions, 67 Q. J. EcoN. 231,
250 (1953), and TAFrT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNM NT OF LABOR UNIoNs 250 (1954).
276. Such terms might include adopting a constitution that would limit the former
freedom of the local, see Machinists Local 113, supra note 226 or dissolving all political
groupings in the local, see TArT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 132
(1954).
277. See, e.g., Aaron, The Union Member's Bill of Rights: The First Two Years, 1
IND. REL. 47, 49 (1962) ; see generally, AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE CoM-
mITTEE ON DEVELOPM ENT OF THE LAW OF UNION ADmINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE, SECnTON
OF LABOR RmATIONs LAW 100-07 (1960).
278. In Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D. D.C. 1961), plaintiff, local lodges of the
International Association of Machinists, alleged that a referendum submitted by the IAM
to the membership which lumped 47 constitutional amendments together for one vote
violated the union constitution and § 101 (a) (1). In holding that the right to vote in referen-
dums cannot be frustrated by such tactics, the court found "that a plain reading of the Act
in its Bill of Rights portion, as well as others, [shows] a clear indication by Congress that
the right to vote extended in the Act is not a mere naked right to cast a ballot."195 F. Supp.
at 916. Similarly, it is contended, the right to vote for officers cannot be frustrated by an
arbitrary call for new elections.
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and clearly if the right is to have any substance, the right to have elected
officers serve out their terms of office must be protected.2 79 The right may be
qualified by the union constitution, but while a trusteeship normally suspends
the officers temporarily during the trusteeship, the removal of an official is
often covered by separate procedures in union constitutions.280 Failure formal-
ly to charge, try, and remove the officer in accordance with the union con-
stitution would mean that a member could obtain a federal injunction pro-
hibiting any new election at all.28' Alternately, because state remedies are
preserved, the member might turn to a state court for an order enjoining the
holding of such election.28
2
If the local officer and his supporters decide not to prevent the election
from being held, a number of remedies may be available to force the inclusion
of the officer's name on the ballot. A member, but probably not the candidate,28 3
could ask a federal court to enjoin the election until his section 101 (a) (1)
right to nominate and vote for candidates is secured.2 8 4 The candidate might
279. The protected right adheres to the member as a member; an officer probably does
not have a protected right under Title I to run for or hold union office. See note 267 supra.
280. The procedure for removal of an officer is precisely spelled out in all constitutions,
and is normally divorced from the suspension of officers that takes place when a trusteeship
is imposed, e.g., compare International Mailers' Union, BY-LAws, arts. XVI, XXIII,
XXIV, XXV (1960) (discipline of officers), with id., art. XIV (trusteeships and the
suspension of officers during a trusteeship). But compare the Automobile Workers' Cou-
sTrrTuTioN (1957), wherein art. 12, § 2(b) provides that there shall be a new election of local
officers following any trusteeship.
281. Of course the international might continue the trusteeship until the officer's term
expired, but having once admitted-by offering to terminate it-that the original reason
no longer exists, it would appear that the international has virtually assured the local officers
success in their Title III action.
282. If the court finds that the present officers were properly elected, it might enjoin the
holding of a new election. Litwin v. Novak, 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959) ;
O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1938). At least the New
York courts have manifested a willingness to intervene at every stage of the election process
and have shown a remarkable willingness to protect the rights not only of members but
of local officers as well. Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J.
1221 (1961).
283. In a series of regrettable opinions, it has been held that § 101(a) (1) does not grant
the right to be a candidate. Byrd v. Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Calif. 1959) ; Flaherty
v. McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300, 303 (S.D. Calif. 1960) ; Johnson v. San Diego Waiters &
Bartenders Union, Local 500, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Calif. 1961); Colpo v. Highway
Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, I.B.T., 49 L.R.R.M. 2295 (D. Del. 1961), appeal
docketed, No. 13,850, 3rd Cir. These courts have reasoned that the "right of candidacy is
derived exclusively from the provisions of Title IV, section 401 (e)3," Colpo v. Highway
Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, I.B.T., supra at 2297, and that Title I is concerned
exclusively with "the rights of the nominator, not the rights of the nominee." Johnson v.
San Diego Waiters & Bartenders Union, Local 500, supra at 447. Not only is this line of
cases unnecessarily narrow-for every candidate may be presumed to have one friend to
go into court for him-but it has placed the express right to nominate candidates granted
by § 101 (a) (1) in question. Aaron, supra note 265, at 52.
284. The nominator's rights have not yet been judicially determined, but despite the
"candidate's cases," note 283 supra, the express language of § 101 (a) (1) should make a
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move to enjoin the election alleging that barring him from the ballot con-
stituted a discipline for which he was not accorded the procedural safeguards
of section 101(a)(5). "Discipline" under section 101(a)(5) has been held
to encompass penalties which result in ineligibility to run for local office.28 5
The success of the candidate's action will depend upon whether his ineligibility.
stems from a dereliction of duty during the period when he served as an officer
-in which case section 101 (a) (5) probably will not apply 286--or whether he is
being disciplined for actions he took as a member.28 7 Section 401(e) of Title
IV (Elections) provides that "every member in good standing shall be
eligible to be a candidate and hold office [subject to section 504 M6 and to rea-
sonable qualifications uniformly imposed]." In addition, although section
403 280 states that section 402 290 is the exclusive post election remedy, section
403 also provides that existing rights and remedies "with respect to elections
prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this
federal injunction available in pre-election cases. Acevedo v. Bookbinders & Machine Opera-
tors Local 25, 196 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) was a post-election case in which the
court held that such an action cannot be maintained by an individual, but only by the
Secretary of Labor under Title IV; in dicta, however, the court supported the position
that "under Title I a member has the right to enjoin violations of the Act in general
either before the alleged violation takes place or perhaps to enjoin further violations. .. "
Id. at 314. A member, denied a right to nominate his candidate, might then move to enjoin
the conduct of the election in which his right to vote for the candidate of his choice is to
be denied in derogation of § 101 (a) (1). See also Mamula v. United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica .... F.2d...., 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2621 (June 19, 1962) (3d Cir. Docket No. 13,782, June 5,
1962).
285. Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paper Hangers of America,
Local 386, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441 (D. Minn. 1961) ; see also Nelson v. Johnson, 49 L.R.R.M.
2389 (D. Minn. 1962).
286. Hamilton v. Guinan, 49 L.R.R.M. 2356 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
287. Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 626, 191 F. Supp. 347 (D.
Del. 1961); same, 48 L.R.R.M. 2331 (D. Del. 1961). And see general discussion at
note 267 supra.
288. Section 504 disqualifies members of the Communist Party, or those convicted of
certain enumerated crimes, from holding any union post (other than clerical or custodial)
for a period of five years from the date of resignation from the Communist Party, from
the date of conviction, or from the end of a prison term.
289. No labor organization shall be required by law to conduct elections of officers
with greater frequency or in a different form or manner than is required by its own
constitution or bylaws, except as otherwise provided by this title. Existing rights
and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with
respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions
of this title. The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already
conducted shall be exclusive.
Section 403,29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. II 1961).
290. Section 402 provides that a member, after exhausting his internal union remedies,
may file a complaint with the Secretary alleging violations of any of the elections procedures
outlined in § 401. As in Title III, the Secretary is to conduct an investigation, and if he finds
probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he is required to bring an action
against the union in a federal court.
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title."'291 Either the nominee or the nominator may, in a pre-election action, re-
quest a court to enjoin the election until the section 401 right of candidacy is
secured.2 92 However, because a reading of sections 402 and 403 may give rise to
the inference that state courts are the exclusive avenues for pre-election
291. A welter of confusion can arise in trying to gain a consistent application of §
403; the best reading is probably that of Summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform
Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. LJ. 119, 135-40 (1961).
[By the first sentence of section 403] state substantive law is pre-empted; the
single uniform body of law is that imposed by the statute.
The picture is blurred by the awkward wording of the second sentence of section
403, for it seems to contradict the first sentence by preserving "existing rights and
remedies to enforce the constitution and by-laws of a labor organization with respect
to elections prior to the conduct thereof." Confusion is added by the third sentence
which reasserts the principle of uniformity, "The remedy provided by this statute
for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." Standing alone,
these might be read as allowing states to apply their own substantive law, at least
so far as their law enforced the union constitution, in actions brought prior to the
election, but preempting state law after the election. This would lead to the anomalous
result that the applicable substantive law would depend on the date the action was
brought. The same conduct, such as restricting nominations, declaring candidates
ineligible, or fixing the date and place of election, would be governed by state law in
pre-election suits and by federal law in post-election proceedings.
Such a reading out of context which blunts the thrust for uniformity is not re-
required by the legislative history, nor does it help fulfill the purpose for which the
second sentence was included....
The central purpose of the second sentence of section 403 was to keep available
prompt pre-election remedies, not to preserve state substantive law. State courts
were retained as a proper forum for suits prior to the election. After the election,
the exclusive procedure is a suit in the federal district court brought by the Secretary.
The election does not work a change of substantive law, but a change of appropriate
forum....
Section 403 can thus be interpreted to avoid internal contradiction and fulfill the
various purposes of its separate sentences. The first sentence makes the federal law,
drawn from the statutory prescriptions and the union constitution, the exclusive body
of substantive law. The second and third sentences allocate the enforcement of that
law to two distinct remedies-one to prevent the violation before it is accomplished,
and the other to redress the evil by holding a new election.
at 136-37 (footnotes omitted).
292. Section 403 does not make it clear whether the act of filing an action prior to the
election is sufficient to preserve plaintiffs' pre-election remedy, or whether conducting of the
election before the court enjoins it will strip the court of its jurisdiction and leave plaintiffs
to their post-election remedies. The final sentence of § 403, stating that the remedy for
"challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive," would seem to imply that the
issue is the date at which the election is "challenged." Consequently, if filing a suit constitutes
a challenge, the filing of an individual's suit before the election is held should be sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction to enter an order voiding the election after it has been held.
Cf. Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 201 F.
Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1961), appeal docketed, No. 13, 850, 3rd Cir., see note 293 infra. But see
Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America .... F.2d...., 30 U.S.L. WuK 2621, (June 19,




redress,293 plaintiffs would be well advised to avoid the federal courts, and
instead, to request a state court to enforce their federal substantive right.2 "
If the election is held without the officer's name on the ballot, the result
may still be challenged under section 402, although here the member must
file his complaint with the Secretary of Labor. Or the Title III action may be
continued on the assumption that legally there never was an election; since
the presence of the trustee was illegal, he had no authority to call any election,
and certainly none to make rules concerning it. Although the last sentence in
section 403, making section 402 the exclusive "post-election remedy," may pre-
sent some surface difficulty, section 402 itself makes clear that it is designed to
293. In Colpo v. Highway Truck Driver & Helpers, Local 107, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
201 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1961), appeal docketed, No. 13,850, 3rd Cir., plaintiff was
nominated for the office of Recording Secretary, but the election committee ruled him in-
eligible because he allegedly had made two late payments of dues over the preceding two
years. International President Hoffa sustained the committee's ruling on Colpo's appeal,
but Colpo still managed to file a suit in a federal court before the election was conducted;
there he alleged violation of his rights under both § 101 (a) (1) and § 401(e). The court
held that the nominee had no right of candidacy under § 101(a) (1) and that Title IV "con-
fers standing to sue exclusively upon the Secretary of Labor, after a complaint is filed with
him by a member" but that "section 403 undoubtedly serves to permit union members to seek
pre-election redress in State courts" where the federal substantive rights of § 401 would
be cognizable in order to avoid the potentially anomalous result suggested by Professor
Summers, see note 291 .supra.
Colpo's failure to make a clairvoyant interpretation of § 403 probably meant it was
too late to get into the proper court with the proper plaintiff before the election was con-
ducted without him. Any post-election redress would have to come via a complaint with the
Secretary, where complainant might meet the fate of Flaherty, see text at notes 205-10 supra,
with the Secretary making his determination as to the reasonableness of the requirement
"on its face."
If the Secretary does find probable cause to believe there has been a violation, he may
obtain voluntary compliance by the union; 82 cases of voluntary compliance were reported
during the first 19 months of the act's operation. Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1961, p. 1,
col. 1. However, in another case the Teamsters have refused to concede that the rule
which prevented Colpo's candidacy-e.g., that a candidate must have paid his dues on or
before the first day of the month for the two years prior to the nomination-was unreason-
able. The Secretary has had to file a Title IV action. [Fiscal Year 1961] BLMR AN. REP.
14-15. The necessary length of the Bureau's investigation, clogged court court dockets,
dilatory tactics by the defendant-union, and appeals may make the post-election court relief
entirely illusory. In the words of Commissioner Holcombe: "Some officers who have been
elected illegally will not be removed by statutory election procedures until their terms of
office have been completed. The urgent mandate of Congress is being nullified. . . . It is
apparent that some faster way of resolving such cases must be found." Wall Street Journal,
May 11, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
294. The state courts' attitude is typified by Beiso v. Robilotto, 47 L.R.R.M. 2590,
2592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). Plaintiffs' nomination for office in Teamster Local 294 had been
rejected. They immediately turned to a state court for an injunction to protect their § 401
right. The court, in granting the injunction, stated:
The court is not impressed with the argument that plaintiffs have another remedy
after the election. All they seek is the right to run for office and while such a right
must be viewed within the framework of the constitution and by-laws of the Union, it
is a valuable right entitled here to such protection under the law as is now being
granted.
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attack only allegedly invalid results of legitimate elections. "The whole struc-
ture of the statute warns against an easy inference of exclusive remedies. '235
CONCLUSION
Title III thus appears to present numerous problems and unanswered ques-
tions, many of which are attributable to the tentative and experimental character
of the statute. Perhaps these are no more than what might be expected from an
initial venture into an area about which so little was known. Notwithstanding
its deficiencies, the title can still be used effectively to meet the abuses at which
it was aimed. Indeed, the force of the title itself, accompanied by the informal
urgings of the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports, has induced voluntary
compliance to the extent that 427 of the 492 trusteeships reported in force
when the act was passed had been terminated by November 30, 1961, and only
88 of the 738 trusteeships reported in effect at or after the passage of the
act were over 18 months old on November 30, 1961.
But compliance does not mean enforcement. The ultimate effectiveness of
the title is not to be found only in the amount of voluntary compliance it can
induce, but in the force it can exert to require compliance by unwilling unions.
Here, major responsibility lies with the Bureau of Labor-Management Re-
ports, whose duty it is to enforce the title. And here, the title has not been
as effective as it might. The Bureau has yet to institute a single suit to enforce
the title.
This absence of enforcement is especially serious because of the open-ended
language of the title and because of the objective of Congress to gather in-
formation through the operation of the title. The broad categories of proper
purpose in section 302 and the mechanics of section 304 place great responsi-
bility on the courts in interpreting the title; they place a correspondingly heavy
burden on the enforcement agency to afford the courts an opportunity to fill
in the broad outline of legislation Congress provided in Title III. Section
305, Congress's plea for further information after three years, is also under-
mined by the absence of vigorous enforcement. The failure of the Bureau to
fulfill these functions of the title through enforcement is puzzling, as is the
Bureau's policy of not making public its findings. If a great part of the title's
impact is supposed to be informational, publication of the Bureau's specific find-
ings in addition to statistical summaries would provide an account of its ex-
periences in administration which would aid immeasurably in performing this
function. The Bureau's failure to enforce and to publicize makes it difficult to
assess the operation of the title; it makes it impossible to assess the performance
of the Bureau. There is no way of knowing or ascertaining how much of the
Bureau's failure to enforce the title is attributable to justifiable findings of non-
violation, how much to narrow coverage of the title-or too narrow interpreta-
tion of this coverage-how much to other erroneous interpretations of the
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uncertain language of the title, how much to administrative difficulties, and how
much to institutional conflicts that cast doubt upon the wisdom of placing
responsibility for enforcing a statute against international union leaderships
in the Department of Labor.296
DONALD R. ANDEISONt
296. An institutional analysis of the Department of Labor is well beyond the scope of
this Comment. Certain features of the Department's operation, however, may be suggested.
These suggestions should be regarded as highly speculative; accordingly, any conclusions
to be drawn from them as extremely tentative. The Department does not in the real sense
"represent" labor, although some labor leaders may think so, see TAFT, THE A.F.
OF L. FROM THE DEATH OF GOMPERS TO THE MERGER 25, 453 (1959); LOMBARDI, LABoR's
VOIcE IN THE CABINET 1-121 (1942) ; but it is the chief locus of activities that help labor,
such as the administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1958). In order to perform its tasks well, the Department
must have a harmonious and sympathetic relationship with the labor movement, which in
practical effect means the prominent national organizations and leaders. The resultant
shaping of attitudes within the Department, while-owing to the political nature of the De-
partment-may not be comparable with the "capture of an administrative agency," see M.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 145-63 (1955) ; D. TRu-
MAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 395-478 (1951), nevertheless exhibits some similar
characteristics.
Before the passage of Landrum-Griffin and in most situations today, the attitudes and
perspective of the Department present few problems because its chief activities were and are
in the area of labor-managment relations, which area is not marked by intra-labor divisive-
ness. The new act, however, is a legislative venture into internal union affairs, and necessar-
ily involves conflicts between different levels of the union organization-especially Title III,
which involves the rights of local unions against their internationals. The problems of en-
forcing Landrum-Griffin are inherent because of its break with the historic tradition of no
federal interference in internal union affairs. On this ground alone, one might expect to see
the enforcement agency troubled by a "cultural lag," especially if that agency has previously
been a part of the historic tradition-in the sense that it has dealt with labor problems in
the past and has learned to avoid any significant participation in internal union affairs.
Given the additional fact that enforcement of the new law is directed at the sources with
which the Department has long been associated and still is for the greater part of its work, it
is quite possible, without there being any improprieties, that enforcement of the law may drag.
Without intending to oversimplify differences, it might be noted that in the area of
management, analogous conflicts might be expected to arise between the interests of the
large business organizations and the interests of the small organizations. And there it might
simply be noted-without considering any of the administrative factors-that neither
the Small Business Administration nor the Anti-Trust Division (of the Department
of Justice), whose subject matters might place them in the Department of Commerce, are
in fact in that department.
In considering where to place the power of enforcement, several choices were available:
Department of Labor; National Labor Relations Board (to which it was entrusted in an
earlier version of the bill; Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72
HARV. L. REv. 609, 643-44 (1959)) ; independent agency (like the NLRB or the Small
Business Administration) ; or another executive department, as for example, the Department
of Health, Education & Welfare or the Department of Justice. For administrative reasons,
it may be advantageous not to split up jurisdiction over the vast informational files con-
cerning labor unions but it is possible that these reasons are outweighted by considerations
concerning the enforcement and effectiveness of the new law.
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TRUSTEESHIPS REPORTED IMPOSED SINCE LMRDA:








AFL-CIO 1 I 1
Actors & Artists I 1 1
Aluminum Workers 3 3 3
Asbestos Workers 1 1 1
Automobile Workers 38 17 17 21 19 2
Bakery Workers (Ind.) 1 1 1
Boilermakers 10 6 6 4 4
Brewery Workers 4 1 1 3 3
Brick & Clay Workers 6 4 4 2 2
Bricklayers 1 1 1
Building Service Employees 2 1 1 1 1
Chemical Workers 9 1 1 8 6 2
Communications Workers 4 4 4
Dining Car Workers (Ind.) 1 1 1
Electrical Workers-IBEW 3 2 2 1 1
Electrical Workers-IUE 1 1 1
Engineers, Operating 4 4 3 1
Flight Engineers 1 1 1
Hotel, Restaurant Employees 20 10 10 10 10
Industrial Workers, Allied 6 4 4 2 2
Industrial Workers, United (Ind.) 2 2 2
Insurance Workers 1 1 1
Jewelry Workers 1 1 1
Laundry Workers (Ind.) 3 3 3
Longshoremen-ILA (Ind.) 4 1 1 3 3
Machinists 3 3 3
Marine & Shipbuilders Workers 1 1 1
Mailers (Ind.) 1 1 1
Marble Polishers 1 1 1
Maritime 1 1 1
Meat Cutters 5 3 3 2 2
Mine, Mill & Smelter
Workers (Ind.) 5 3 3 2 2
Mine Workers, United (Ind.)
District 50 6 6 6 1
Office Employees 1 1 1 1
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LOCALS
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 1 1 1
Packinghouse, Food & Allied
Workers 3 3 3
Painters 2 2 2
Papermakers & Paperworkers 1 1 1
Printing Pressmen 4 2 1 1 2 2
Retail Clerks 7 2 2 5 5
Sheet Metal Workers 1 1 1
Steelworkers 47 14 14 33 27 6
Teamsters (Ind.) 8 3 3 5 5
Textile Workers-TWUA 5 1 1 4 1 3
Toy Workers 3 3 3
Transport Service I 1 1
Typographical 1 1 1
Upholsterers 2 2 2
Woodworkers 2 1 1 1 1
TOTAL LocALs 241 103 101 2 138 116 22
INTERMEDIATE BODIES
Air Line Pilots 1 I I
Hotel, Restaurant Employees 1 1 1
Machinists 1 1 1
Textile Workers-TWUA 1 1 1
Toy Workers 1 1 1
TOTAL INTERMEDIATE BODIES 5 2 2 3 2 1
TOTAL OF ALL UNION BODIES
UNDER TRUSTEESHIPS 246 105 103 2 141 118 23
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UNTERMINATED TRUSTEESHIPS
Over 18 Months Old On November 30, 1961
00
Name of Union 1 w 4 f
LOCALS
Actors & Artists 1 1
Asbestos Workers 1 1
Automobile Workers 3 1 2
Bakery Workers (Ind.) 3 3
Bill Posters 1 1
Brick & Clay Workers 2 2
Bricklayers 1 1
Building Service Employees 1 I
Carpenters 4 4
Chemical Workers 3 1 2
Dining Car Workers (Ind.) 2 1 1
Engineers, Operating 2 1 1
Hotel, Restaurant Employees 1 1
Industrial Workers, United (Ind.) 2 2
Longshoremen-ILA (Ind.) 4 4
Marine & Shipbuilders 1 1
Maritime 1 1
Meat Cutters 2 2
Mine Workers, United (Ind.) 14 14
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers I 1
Packinghouse Workers (Ind.) I I
Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers 2 2
Steelworkers 8 2 6
Teamsters (Ind.) 1 1
Textile Workers-TWUA 4 1 3
TOTAL LocALs 66 44 22
INTERMEDIATE BODIES
Mine Workers, United (Ind.) 21 21
Textile Workers-TWUA 1 1
TOTAL INTERMEDIATE BODIES 22 21 1
TOTAL oF ALL UNION BODIES
UNDER TRusTmsHiaps 88 65 23




SEC. 301.(a) Every labor organization which has or assumes trusteeship over any sub-
ordinate labor organization shall file with the Secretary within thirty days after the date
of the enactment of this Act or the imposition of any such trusteeship, and semiannually
thereafter, a report, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers,
as well as by the trustees of such subordinate labor organization, containing the following
information: (1) the name and address of the subordinate organization; (2) the date of
establishing the trusteeship; (3) a detailed statement of the reason or reasons for establish-
ing or continuing the trusteeship; and (4) the nature and extent of participation by the
membership of the subordinate organization in the selection of delegates to represent such
organization in regular or special conventions or other policy-determining bodies and in the
election of officers of the labor organization which has assumed trusteeship over such sub-
ordinate organization. The initial report shall also include a full and complete account of
the financial condition of such subordinate organization as of the time trusteeship was as-
sumed over it. During the continuance of a trusteeship the labor organization which has
assumed trusteeship over a subordinate labor organization shall file on behalf of the sub-
ordinate labor organization the annual financial report required by section 201(b) signed
by the president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers of the labor organization
which has assumed such trusteeship and the trustees of the subordinate labor organization.
(b) The provisions of section 201(c), 205, 206, 208, and 210 shall be applicable to
reports filed under this title.
(c) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(d) Any person who makes a false statement or representation of a material fact, know-
ing it to be false, or who knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, in any report required
under the provisions of this section or willfully makes any false entry in or willfully with-
holds, conceals, or destroys any documents, books, records, reports, or statements upon
which such report is based, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
(e) Each individual required to sign a report under this section shall be personally
responsible for the filing of such report and for any statement contained therein which he
knows to be false.
PURPOSES FOR WHICH A TRUSTEESHIP MAY BE ESTABLISHED
SEC. 302. Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor organization
over a subordinate body only in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the organi-
zation which has assumed trusteeship over the subordinate body and for the purpose of cor-
recting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining
agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures,
or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization.
UNLAWFUL ACTS RELATING TO LABOR ORGANIZATION UNDER TRUSTEESHIP
SEC. 303. (a) During any period when a subordinate body of a labor organization is in
trusteeship, it shall be unlawful (1) to count the vote of delegates from such body in any
convention or election of officers of the labor organization unless the delegates have been
chosen by secret ballot in an, election in Which all the members in good standing of such
subordinate body were eligible to participate, or (2) to transfer to such organization any
current receipts or other funds of the subordinate body except the normal per capita tax
and assessments payable by subordinate bodies not in trusteeship: Provided, That nothing
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herein contained shall prevent the distribution of the assets of a labor organization in ac-
cordance with its constitution and bylaws upon the bona fide dissolution thereof.
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
ENFORCEMENT
SEC. 304. (a) Upon the written complaint of any member or subordinate body of a labor
organization alleging that such organization has violated the provisions of this title (except
section 301) the Secretary shall investigate the complaint and if the Secretary finds prob-
able cause to believe that such violation has occurred and has not been remedied he shall,
without disclosing the identity of the complainant, bring a civil action in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any member or subordinate body of a labor organiza-
tion affected by any violation of this title (except section 301) may bring a civil action in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such
relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
(b) For the purpose of actions under this section, district courts of the United States
shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which the
principal office of such labor organization is located, or (2) in any district in which its duly
authorized officers or agents are engaged in conducting the affairs of the trusteeship.
(c) In any proceeding pursuant to this section a trusteeship established by a labor or-
ganization in conformity with the procedural requirements of its constitution and bylaws
and authorized or ratified after a fair hearing either before the executive board or before
such other body as may be provided in accordance with its constitution or bylaws shall be
presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its establishment and shall
not be subject to attack during such period except upon clear and convincing proof that
the trusteeship was not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable
under section 302. After the expiration of eighteen months the trusteeship shall be presumed
invalid in any such proceeding and its discontinuance shall be decreed unless the labor
organization shall show by clear and convincing proof that the continuation, of the trustee-
ship is necessary for a purpose allowable under section 302. In the latter event the court
may dismiss the complaint or retain jurisdiction of the cause on such conditions and for
such period as it deems appropriate.
REPORT TO CONGRESS
SEc. 305. The Secretary shall submit to the Congress at the expiration of three years
from the date of enactment of this Act a report upon the operation of this title.
COMPLAINT BY SECRETARY
SEC. 306. The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies at law or in equity: Provided, That upon the filing of a com-
plaint by the Secretary the jurisdiction of the district court over such trusteeship shall be
exclusive and the final judgment shall be res judicata.
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